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The Impact of United States v. Bes foods on Parent
Liability Under CERCLA: When a Door Is Closed,
Look for an Open Window
JESSICA DEMONTE*
In 1999, the United States Supreme Court decided United States v.
Bestfoods, which held that CERCLA liability could be applied derivatively to a
parent corporation for the pollution of a subsidiary only when, under the
traditional common law tests, the corporate "veil" of the subsidiary could be
pierced. After tracing out the purpose and history of CERCL4 and the common
law ability to pierce the corporate veil, this Comment argues that the Bestfoods
decision correctly applied common law veil-piercing standards to derivative
CERCL4 liability. Further, it argues that an issue which the Supreme Court
failed to address--the standard of veil piercing that should be applied-can be
resolved by the creation of a comprehensive federal veil-piercing standard.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1980, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA)' in an effort to clean up hazardous
waste contamination located throughout the United States.2 One of the main goals
of the statute was to hold entities who were responsible for placing the
contamination at a site liable for the costs of eliminating the waste and the risks
associated with it CERCLA addressed who could be potentially liable parties
for such clean up costs 4 However, CERCLA did not specifically include parent
corporations within its definition of liable parties.5 Due to this omission, the
circuits are split over whether a parent corporation could be liable under
CERCLA for actions taken by its subsidiary in the operation of a facility when the
traditional exception to limited liability, piercing the corporate veil, does not
* This Comment is dedicated to my husband, Nathan D. McClung, and my parents,
Timothy and Patricia DeMonte. Thank you for your love and support.
1 See The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of
1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994 & Supp. m 1997).
2 See infra notes 18-19 and accompanying text (discussing CERCLA's purpose and
goals).
3 See infia note 19 and accompanying text.
4 See CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1994) (discussing liable parties under
CERCLA).
5 See CERCLA § 101(21), 42 U.S.C. 9601(21) (1994) (defining what entities are persons
for liability issues under CERCLA).
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apply.6 In 1998, the Supreme Court settled the split with its decision in United
States v. Bes'ffoods.7
In Besfoods, the Court held that a parent corporation can be derivatively
liable for the actions of its subsidiary only when facts are present which would
justify piercing the corporate veil and abrogating the parent's traditional limited
liability status because it significantly failed to respect the corporate form.8
However, while the Court did appear to heighten the standard for derivative
liability, it made it clear that a parent can be liable in another way-it can be
directly liable for its own actions in hazardous waste contamination.9 Under
Besfoods, a parent can be directly liable for its own actions if it is operating a
facility, even if the facility is owned by its subsidiary. 10 Thus, this decision directs
the lower courts to focus on the parent's actions with respect to the contaminated
facility and not just its actions toward the subsidiary.1I
Part II of this Comment will give a brief overview of the relevant law on the
issue of parent liability under CERCLA prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Bestfoods. Part III will discuss the procedural history and the factual setting of the
case and Part IV will discuss the Court's holding and analysis in its decision. Part
V will consider the impact of Bestfoods on CERCLA liability and what the
holdings mean for parent corporations, as well as identify a specific omission in
the decision which will lead to conflict among the circuits and will require future
resolution by the Supreme Court.
II. THE RELEVANT LAW ON PARENT LiABiLriy UNDER CERCLA PRIOR TO
BESTFOODS
In Besfoods, the Supreme Court decided the issue of whether a parent
corporation can be liable under CERCLA for the actions of its subsidiary without
requiring that the corporate veil be pierced to assign liability.12 In answering this
question, the Court considered a mix of corporate common law and statutory
environmental law. Traditionally, corporate parents, like individual shareholders,
are afforded the protection of limited liability.13 On the other hand, CERCLA was
6 See infra Part II.C (discussing the split among the circuits concerning parent liability
under CERCLA).
7 See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998).
8 See id. at 63-64.
9 See id at 65-66.
10 See id. at 67-68.
11 See id. at 68.
12 See id
13 See WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BuSINEss ORGANIZATION AND
FiNANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLEs 139-41 (6th ed. 1996); WHIUAM A. KLEIN & .
MARK RAMSEYER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON BuSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: AGENCY,
PARTNERSHIPS & CORPORATIONS 215 (3d ed. 1997) [hereinafter BusINESS ASSOCIATIONs].
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passed to prevent and clean up hazardous waste contamination. 14 Its goal is to
hold parties who are responsible for the contamination liable for the costs of its
clean up.15 The circuits have taken different positions on what effect CERCLA's
passage has had on a parent's limited liability in this context 16 This Part will
briefly summarize the relevant law as it existed on the issue of parent liability
prior to the Supreme Court's ruling.
A. CERCLA
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act of 1980 (CERCLA) was passed as a response mechanism to deal with the
increased number of sites being discovered in which hazardous waste
contamination was posing a significant threat to public health and environmental
welfare. 17 CERCLA was the first federal statute enacted to prevent and remediate
such hazardous waste contamination.18
CERCLA's goal is to hold liable parties who are responsible or who
contributed to the contamination and force these parties to reimburse the
government or pay for the costs of cleaning up the harmed site.19 Under
14 See infra note 18.
15 See JANET S. KOLE& LARRYD. ESPEL, ENVIRONMENTAL LmGATION 1 (1991).
16 See infira Part 1[.C and accompanying text.
17 See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994); see also KOLE & ESPEL, supra note 15,
at 1 (stating that CERCLA was adopted as a direct response to the Love Canal incident which
involved buried hazardous waste in a residential area).
18 See NANCY K. KUBASEK & GARY S. SILVERMAN, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 193 (2d ed.
1997) (noting that one of CERCLA's goals was to prevent releases of hazardous wastes into the
environment, using liability for remediation costs as a disincentive to achieve that goal). In
addition, Congress intended that under CERCLA, the government would take an active role in
the reclamation of contaminated sites. See id at 207. This was accomplished by establishing a
fund (the Superfund) with which to finance clean up projects of contaminated sites. Responsible
parties would be sought out by the government and would be forced to either clean up the sites
themselves or make payments to the fund if the government cleaned up the site initially. See id.
at 208. If a responsible party could not be found, then the government fund, and, in the end, the
taxpayers, would bear the costs. Therefore, the public would have an incentive to ensure that
hazardous wastes were disposed of properly to avoid this situation. See i at 211.
However, while the fund is intended to pay for the clean up of contaminated sites for those
areas where a responsible party cannot be located or are in urgent need of clean up, in reality
44% of the money in the fund is spent on litigation expenses for those parties that the
government seeks to hold liable for the clean-up costs. See KOLE & ESPEL, supra note 15, at 1.
19 See KOLE & ESPEL, supra note 15, at 1; see also E.PA. Revives Lender Liability Rule,
in THE 1997 ExEcurivE FILE: HOT GOVERNMENTAL ISSUES 9 (M. Lee Smith, ed., 1997)
[hereinafter 1997 ExECuTVE FILE] (noting that the goal of CERCLA is that the "polluter pays"
for the costs of cleaning up the contamination). The goal of CERCLA is to require "those
responsible for any damage, environmental hami, or injury from chemical poisons [to] bear the
costs of their actions." S. REP. No. 96-848, at 13 (1980). This goal has been supported by the
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CERCLA section 107(a),20 a potentially responsible party21 can be any person 22
courts. See generally B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192,1198 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting
that courts should give a liberal interpretation to CERCLA to ensure that its congressional
purpose is accomplished); United States v. A&N Cleaners & Launderers, 788 F. Supp. 1317,
1331 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (explaining that "courts generally resolve ambiguities in CERCLA's
language in favor of imposing the most expansive liability, citing the statute's remedial
purpose").
20 CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994) reads as follows:
a) Covered persons; scope; recoverable costs and damages; interest rate; "comparable
maturity" date
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the defenses
set forth in subsection (b) of this section-
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility
(2) any person who at the time of a disposal of any hazardous substance owned
or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of;
(3) any person who by contract agreement or otherwise arranged for disposal
or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or
treatment of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any
other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by
another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport
to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such
person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the
occurrence of response costs, of hazardous substance, shall be liable for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States
Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national
contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incured by any other person
consistent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources,
including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss
resulting from such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out
under § 9604(i) of this title.
2 1 See generally 2 JOHN HENRY DAvIDsON & ORLANDO E. DELOGu, FEDERAL
ENViRONMENTAL REGULATION § 6.10 (1989) (noting that the term applies to those persons who
may be liable for clean-up expenses under CERCLA); KOLE & ESPEL, supra note 15, at 1-2
(using the term to describe any one of the four categories of liable parties under section 107(a));
ALFRED R. LIGHT, CERCLA LAW AND PROCEDURE 94 (1991) (same).
22 CERCLA § 101(21), 42 U.S.C. 9601(21) (1994) defines persons under CERCLA to
include: "[Ain individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, consortium, joint venture,
commercial entity, United States Government State, municipality, commission, political
subdivision of a state, or any interstate body." (emphasis added); see also LIGHT, supra note 21,
at 94 (stating that in the definition of person under CERCLA, there is no express inclusion of
corporate officers and directors, yet courts have routinely found such individuals personally
liable for their actions in a corporation's polluting policies).
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who is a current owner or operator23 of a contaminated facility,24 any person who
was the owner or operator of the facility at the time the disposal took place,25 any
person who was or is a generator of hazardous waste materials,2 6 or any person
who was or is a transporter 27 of hazardous waste material to the site at which the
contamination is present or where a release has occurred. 2s Bestfoods deals
specifically with a parent's liability as an operator or owner of a facility under
section 107(a).2 9
There are other aspects of CERCLA that should be noted in this discussion.
For example, CERCLA liability is also strict liability.30 Therefore, if a party can
be classified as one of the four potentially liable parties listed in CERCLA
section 107(a) when a release has taken place, that party will be liable for the
clean-up costs3 1 In addition, CERCLA liability is joint and several; thus, if there
23 See KOLE & ESPEL, supra note 15, at 7 (indicating that current owners and operators of
facilities can be liable under CERCLA).
24 CERCLA § 101(9), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1994) defines a facility as:
(A) any building or structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline (including any pipe
into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works), well, pit pond, lagoon, impoundment,
ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or
area where hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or
otherwise come to be located; but does not include any consumer product in consumer use
or any vessel.
See also LIGHT, supra note 21, at 74-75 (noting that the definition of "facility" is specifically
broad so that as long as hazardous waste is present, the area or thing will fall under the
definition).
2 5 See LIGHT, supra note 21, at 94-95 (stating that the goal of CERCLA is to hold liable
those who are responsible for the contamination or those who did contribute to the
contamination even if they are no longer associated with the facility at issue); KOLE & ESPEL,
supra note 15, at 7 (same).
26 See KOLE & ESPEL, supra note 15, at 1 (describing the four categories of potentially
responsible parties to include generators). While generators might be liable under the statute,
generator liability is not directly at issue in Besfoods, even if the principle holdings of the case
could apply in this context.
27 See id; LIGHT, supra note 21, at 121-22 (noting that a potentially liable party can be an
individual who transports hazardous waste to the facility for disposal).
28 See CERCLA § 101(22), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1994) (giving the definition of a
hazardous waste release under CERCLA).
29 See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 51 (1998) (Syllabus).
3 0
,See KUBASEK & SILVERMAN, supra note 18, at 210; LIGHT, supra note 21, at 122
(citing United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167 (4th Cir. 1988), which holds that
liability under CERCLA is strict or absolute liability).
31 Liability under CERCLA is strict liability or liability which is imposed without regard
to actual fault. See 1997 EXECunVEFreE, supra note 19, at 9 (noting that this is why a current
owner who has not necessarily contributed to the contamination of a site, but has not taken steps
to stop the spread of the pollution can be liable under CERCLA). Under CERCLA, so long as
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are numerous parties who are liable for the contamination, any one of these
parties can be required to pay the entire amount of the clean-up judgment
(ensuring that the government gets paid back or that the clean up is undertaken
even if some of the contributors are insolvent).32 Finally, there are very few
exceptions to liability under CERCLA once the determination is made that a party
is one of the types listed in section 107(a).33
B. Traditional Concepts of Corporate Common Law
Corporations are a fairly recent development that enable large amounts of
capital to be pooled together to accomplish more expansive goals.3 4 Partial
ownership is a key incentive to investment in a corporation.3 5 Traditionally, these
investors have been protected from liability for the actions and debts of the
corporation by the concept of limited liability.36 A corporation, as a legal entity,37
an individual can be classified as a potentially responsible party, that individual can be legally
responsible regardless of whether or not he was a significant contributor in the contamination
activities. See KUBASEK & SILVERMAN, supra note 18, at 210 (noting that under CERCLA,
individuals can be liable even if they were in compliance with the laws in existence at the time
the release or disposal occurred); LIGHT, supra note 21, at 122. Light discusses the application
of strict liability for CERCLA violations, noting that when enacting the statute, Congress
discussed the notion that CERCLA liability should be of the same nature as liability under the
Clean Water Act. At the time of CERCLA's passage, the Clean Water Act had already been
interpreted by courts to impose strict liability on violators. See id. (citing 126 CONG. REC.
HI 1788 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) for illustration). In addition, according to Monsanto Co., 858
F.2d at 167, courts have routinely applied strict liability under CERCLA since its passage.
32 Liability under CERCLA is joint and several liability and can be applied retroactively.
See B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1198 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that CERCLA
liability is joint and several); O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 183 (1st Cir. 1989) (same);
DAVIDSON & DELOGu, supra note 21, § 6.07 (noting that under CERCLA "every party who is
liable in any way or to any degree is potentially liable for the entire cost of clean-up" and it is
their responsibility to seek indemnification from any other liable parties); 1997 EXECUnVE
FILE, supra note 19, at 9.
33 There are few exceptions to liability under CERCLA. See CERCLA § 107(b), 42
U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1994) (listing the exceptions to liability under CERCLA, which include "acts
of God" and "acts of war"). There is also an innocent purchaser defense that can be raised by a
purchaser of contaminated property who acquires contaminated property without knowledge of
the contamination. See KOLE & ESPEL, supra note 15, at 12 (discussing the exceptions to
liability under CERCLA). Another recognized exception is the secured creditor exemption
which exempts from liability any owner who acquired property involuntarily or by foreclosure,
who is only involved with a facility to protect a security interest, and who does not actively
participate in the management of the facility. See 1997 EXECTrIVE FILE, supra note 19, at 9.
34 See generally KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 13, at 114-18.
35 See id. at 105.
3 6 See id at 106; THOMAS HEIDEN, RESPONsIBELrIY OF THE CORPORATE PARENT FOR
AcrvrrmEs OF A SuBsIDiARY 67-68 (1986) (noting that one goal of limited liability is to
promote investment which in turn stimulates economic growth).
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can take advantage of this limited liability when owning a subsidiary
corporation-the corporation who owns the shares of the other is called the parent
corporation.38 Thus, a parent corporation, like a traditional shareholder, will
usually not be liable for the actions or debts of its subsidiary, because it is
protected by limited liability.39
The traditional rule is that parent corporations, like shareholders, are not
liable for the debts and actions of their subsidiaries.40 This concept is known as
limited liability, because shareholders or parents are only liable for the
corporation's debts up to the amount of their investment 41 Therefore, creditors
and judgment holders cannot seek additional assets from shareholders or from the
parent corporations to satisfy the debts or judgments of the owned corporation or
subsidiary.42
There are few exceptions to this rule of law.43 One main exception arguably
applicable to parent liability under CERCLA exists at common law,4 and a
second exception which might also apply is suggested by the Court in the dictum
of Besfoods.
The first exception is when the corporate form-or the protection of limited
liability-is disregarded because the parent and the subsidiary are in reality one
entity. This "unity of interest"45 justifies piercing the corporate veil of limited
3 7 See KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 13, at 108-09 (discussing the notion that a corporation
is sometimes deemed a "fictional" entity because it takes on the legal characteristics of a
"human being" even though it obviously is not).
3 8 See BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONs, supra note 13, at 215.
3 9 See LIGHT, supra note 21, at 101-02 (stating that ownership of a corporation is
generally insufficient by itself to produce liability for a parent or a shareholder for the actions of
a subsidiary or a corporation).
40 See KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 13, at 139-41 (finding that under corporate common
law shareholders are not liable for debts incurred in the operation of a corporation).
4 1 See id.
4 2 See id.
4 3 See generally United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 61 (1998) (quoting Anderson v.
Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 362 (1944), which found that "[1limited liability is the rule, not the
exception"). However, exceptions do exist to this basic principle. See HEIDEN, supra note 36, at
87 (stating that exceptions to limited liability occur when the courts balance the benefits of
limited liability against its costs and the costs are greater). For example, one exception is called
"piercing the corporate veil." This will occur most often in situations where the corporation is
closely held, or is almost solely owned by one party. Courts allow limited liability to be
abrogated in this case because there is little or no separation between the management of the
corporation and those who bear the risk of investment in the corporation. Courts realize that in
situations like these the interests of the parties coincide or there is a unity of interests. See id. at
87-88.
44 See KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 13, at 139-41 (discussing the exceptions to limited
liability and specifically addressing the exception of piercing the corporate veil, which
developed at common law).
45 See generally Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Pepper Source, 941 F.2d 519, 520 (7th Cir. 1991)
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liability to reach the assets of the shareholder-parent, so that the subsidiary's debts
and judgments can be satisfied.4 6 The second exception, as implied by the Court
in Besfoods, is that if Congress wished to abrogate the common law principle of
limited liability, it could accomplish this by expressly stating in the statute that the
principle does not apply under CERCLA 47 Thus, parents would not have limited
liability protection for CERCLA violations of their subsidiaries.
However, despite the lack of express language to that effect in CERCLA,
certain courts have interpreted the statute to imply that a parent can be liable for
the actions of a subsidiary without having to go through the traditional exception
of piercing the corporate veil.48 Yet, some circuits have not followed this lead.49
1. Veil-Piercing
Piercing the corporate veil has been called a 'murky" 50 concept and one of
the "most confusing [areas] of corporate law,"51 because given identical fact
patterns, courts have reached very conflicting results. In other words, when faced
with the exact same situation, some courts will pierce the corporate veil and
others will not.52
One reason for the confusion is that there exists no universal standard to
(stating that one requirement to pierce the corporate veil is that there be a "unity of interest"
between the owner and the corporation such that they are in essence one entity); Kinney Shoe
Corp. v. Polan, 939 F2d 209,211 (4th Cir. 1991) (same).
4 6 See KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 13, at 140; see also infra Part ll.B.1.a.i.
4 7 See BesOfoods, 524 U.S. at 62 (finding that CERCLA did not expressly pre-empt the
common concept of limited liability, and thus the principle still applied); see also United States
v. Cordova Chem. Co., 113 F.3d 572, 579 (6th Cir. 1997) (same); Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. TL.
James & Co., 893 F. 2d 80, 82-83 (5th Cir. 1990) (same).
4 8 See infra Part lI.C (discussing the different interpretations of CERCLA espoused by
various courts); see also LIGHT, supra note 21, at 98-99 (noting that CERCLA's silence on the
issue of parent liability has been treated as permission to ignore the corporate form, a move
which courts have justified by looking to CERCLA's goal of making those responsible for
contamination pay for its clean up).
49 See infra Part II.C.3.
50 KLEIN& COFFEE, supra note 13, at 140.
51 HEIDEN, supra note 36, at 13 (citing Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited
Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89 (1985)).
52 See id. (noting that parties have a difficult time predicting the outcome in a veil-piercing
situation because "piercing seems to happen freakishly'). Compare HEIDEN, supra note 36, at
87-89 (suggesting that courts are more willing to pierce the corporate veil in specific situations
depending on the circumstances and actors involved and may be more likely to pierce the veil
to reach the assets of a corporate owner than those of an individual shareholder); KOLE &
ESPEL, supra note 15, at 8 (suggesting that courts are more likely to hold a parent corporation
liable when the parent has benefited from the actions of the subsidiary) ith KLEIN & COFFEE,
supra note 13, at 141 (noting that courts are not more likely to pierce the corporate veil when
the owner is a corporation and not an individual shareholder).
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deternine when a parent corporation should be held liable for the actions of its
subsidiary.53 Individual states may and do have different standards. 54 The most
common standard requires that the parent and the subsidiary share a "unity of
interest '55 or that the subsidiary functions as the "alter ego" 56 of the parent
corporation. Some states apply this standard, but also require an additional finding
5 3 See infra note 54 (discussing several different state standards).
5 4 Corporations are the creations of state law. States have developed individualized
common law to govern corporations within their borders. Veil-piercing standards are no
exception. Most states require that there be a showing that the two entities were in reality acting
as one, which is also known as the "alter-ego" element. However, some states also require a
showing of fraud or a showing that the parent was using the subsidiary illegally to avoid
liability. See United States v. Cordova Chemical Co., 113 F.3d 572, 580 (6th Cir. 1997) (listing
the elements for veil piercing in Michigan to include fraud as an element); Sea-Land Serv., Inc.
v. Pepper Source, 941 F.2d 519, 520-21 (7th Cir. 1991) (requiring, under Illinois law, a
showing of fraud); Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80, 83 (5th Cir. 1990)
(noting that fraud is an element in the Fifth Circuit). But see Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Polan, 939
F.2d 209, 211 (4th Cir. 1991) (discussing the West Virginia test for veil piercing as having two
requirements: (1) unity of interest and (2) whether the result would be inequitable if the
corporate form was respected); see also AT&T Global Info. Solutions Co. v. Union Tank Car
Co., 29 F. Supp. 2d 857, 866 (S.D. Ohio 1998), which describes the elements for veil piercing
in Ohio. Union Tank describes a three part test: (1) that the "corporation has no separate mind,
will, or existence, of its own," (2) control by the parent "was in such a manner as to commit
fraud or an illegal act," and (3) "injury and unjust loss resulted to the plaintiff." Id. at 866. Yet,
when analyzing how Ohio courts have treated the "fraud" element in the test, Union Tank noted
that the Supreme Court of Ohio in Belevedere Condominium Unit Owner's Ass 'n. v. R.E. Roark
Cos., 617 N.E. 2d 1075 (Ohio 1993) stated that "the requirement that a corporation beformedin
order to perpetuate a fraud is simply too strict." Id. at 1085 (emphasis in original). Therefore,
according to Union Tank, Ohio courts allow veil piercing when "inequitable or unfair
consequences have resulted" instead of fraud. Union Tank, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 868 (citing a list of
Ohio decisions which agree with this proposition). Thus, the Ohio standard appears to be more
lenient than the standards for Michigan or Louisiana; see also KOLE & ESPEL, supra note 15, at
8 (finding that some standards will allow the corporate veil to be pierced if the subsidiary's
corporate identity is a sham).
55 See Union Tank, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 866 (describing the Ohio standard as when the
subsidiary has ' no separate mind, will, or existence of its own"); see also KLEIN & CoFFEE,
supra note 13, at 140 (detailing the "disregard [of] the separate character of the corporate
entity").
56 See KOLE& ESPEL, supra note 15, at 8. Kole and Espel explain:
Under normal corporate law principles, parent corporations are generally insulated from
the debts and liabilities of their subsidiaries, just as individual stockholders are insulated
from corporate debts and liabilities. A parent corporation, however, can be found to be
derivatively liable for its subsidiary's debts if a court determines that a subsidiary finctions
merely as an alter ego of a parent.
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that the parent used the subsidiary to perpetuate fraud or to avoid personal
liabilities by illegal means in order for the veil to be pierced. 57
a. Alter-Ego Considerations
When considering whether a subsidiary is an "alter-ego" of a parent
corporation, courts will consider a multitude of factors. Probably one of the most
important criteria is whether or not a subsidiary is wholly owned by the parent
corporation.58 Although this is not itself sufficient to justify piercing the corporate
veil, there has yet to be a case which has permitted the corporate veil to be pierced
in order to hold a shareholder-parent of a public corporation personally liable
when there are thousands of other legal entities who own stock in the
subsidiary.59
A court will also closely consider the financial arrangement between the two
corporations, whether corporate formalities are respected, whether the
corporations have officers and directors in common, and whether and to what
extent the parent is involved with the day-to-day operations of the subsidiary's
management 60 Another important consideration for the court is whether the
57 See Joslyn Mfg. Co., 893 F.2d at 83 (finding that Louisiana law requires that "[veil
piercing should be limited to situations in which the corporate entity is used as a sham to
perpetuate a fraud or avoid personal liability"); Cordova Chemical Co., 113 F.3d at 580 (6th
Cir. 1997) (applying unity of interest test but also requiring that the subsidiary be used to
perpetuate fraud, which was not present in that case); see also KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 13,
at 140.
58 See HEIDEN, supra note 36, at 16; LIGHT, supra note 21, at 98-99 (noting that closely
held corporations (which include parent-subsidiary relationships) generally "debunk' the
policies which support a concept of limited liability because in many cases the interests of the
corporations coincide with the interests of the owners or they are no longer separate entities in
reality). But see In re Acushnet River, 675 F. Supp. 22, 32 (D. Mass. 1987) (stating that to find
a parent liable under CERCLA more than just ownership of the subsidiary must be shown).
5 9 See KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 13, at 141; HEIDEN, supra note 36, at 87-88 (finding
that in most cases where veil piercing has been permitted by a court the corporation has been
closely held or the stock was owned by a very small number of individuals or entities such as a
parent corporation).6 0 See HEIDEN, supra note 36, at 16-20. Heiden articulates a large number of
considerations courts will take into account when determining if the subsidiary is an alter-ego of
the parent. Courts will consider: (1) whether the parent has full ownership of all of the
subsidiary's stock; (2) whether the subsidiary is financed by the parent; (3) whether the amount
of influence the parent has over the financial affairs of the subsidiary is extensive; (4) whether
the corporations share officers and directors; (5) whether the subsidiary holds its own
shareholder and director's meetings and maintains its own corporate formalities (like an elected
board of directors); (6) whether the business contracts between the two corporations tend to
favor the parent; (7) whether they keep separate accounts and books or comingle funds; (8)
whether officers of the parent determine the policies of the subsidiary; (9) the extent to which
the officers and directors of the parent are connected to the tort or contract on which the suit is
based; (10) the type of business each corporation is involved in and whether the subsidiary only
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subsidiary is adequately capitalized for the type of business operation that it
undertakes.61 Depending on the jurisdiction, a court may, after considering these
factors, find that the subsidiary corporation is in fact an alter-ego for the parent, or
that the interests of the two entities coincide so much that they cannot legally be
distinguished from one another. In this situation, a court will allow the corporate
veil to be pierced and the parent's assets will not be protected by limited
liability.62
b. Fraud or the Avoidance ofPersonal Liability
Some jurisdictions have held that the parent corporation maintains its limited
liability even when the subsidiary is found to be an alter-ego of the parent (upon
consideration of the aforementioned factors).6 3 These jurisdictions require that a
subsidiary be used by a parent to perpetuate fraud or avoid personal liabilities,
which raditionally means that the subsidiary was formed or used to fraudulently
avoid payment of the debts by the parentf 4 However, not all courts require such a
does business with the parent or has other clients as well; (11) extent to which the business
world treats the two corporations as one unit; (12) the ability of the parent to control the
activities of the subsidiary, (13) extent to which the parent is involved in the day-to-day
operations of the subsidiary; and (14) whether the subsidiary is undercapitalized for the type of
business it conducts. See id.; see also LIGHT, supra note 21, at 105 (suggesting some additional
criteria that courts consider in determining if a subsidiary is an alter-ego of the parent: (1) if they
have common business departments; (2) if the two corporations have consolidated financials
and tax returns; (3) if the parent caused the subsidiary to be incorporated; (4) if the parent pays
the expenses of the subsidiary, (5) if the subsidiary only does business with the parent; (6) if the
parent uses the subsidiary's property as if it were its own; and (7) if the daily operations of the
two are kept separate).
6 1 See HEIDEN, supra note 36, at 91 (noting that a parent can use a subsidiary to undertake
risky activities and still avoid liability for itself, and therefore there is little "incentive" for a
parent to keep the subsidiary adequately capitalized in such a situation, since the capital is lost if
the subsidiary is found liable for some action). Compare KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 13, at
140 (stating that undercapitalization of a subsidiary is an important consideration under a veil-
piercing standard, but that it, like mere ownership, is not sufficient in and of itself to justify
piercing the corporate veil) with LIGHT, supra note 21, at 103 (suggesting that some courts have
determined that to do justice to the goals of CERCLA, parents should be liable if a subsidiary
lacks the resources to pay for its environmental harms). See generally HEIDEN, supra note 36, at
21 (noting that another consideration of courts is the undercapitalization of the subsidiary
considering the business in which it is involved) (citingJoslyn Mfg. Co., 893 F.2d at 80).
6 2 See KOLE & ESPEL, supra note 15, at 8 (finding that the corporate form can be
disregarded in the interest of "convenience, fairness and equity").
6 3 See generally United States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 113 F.3d 572, 580 (6th Cir. 1997)
(applying the Michigan veil-piercing standard where a showing of fraud or injustice is required
to permit limited liability to be abrogated); Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Pepper Source, 941 F2d
519, 520-21 (7th Cir. 1991) (requiring a showing of fraud to permit the corporate veil to be
pierced under Illinois law).
64 See Cordova Chem. Co., 113 F.3d at 580; Sea-Land Serv., 941 F.2d. at 520-21; Joslyn
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strict standard-some jurisdictions require only that the parent-subsidiary
relationship be used to promote injustice or an inequity.65 Promotion of injustice
requires a lesser showing on the part of the plaintiff or government to achieve veil
piercing than a showing of fraud requires. 66
2. Other Theories ofLiability
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit stated that a parent corporation
might be directly liable under a theory of joint venture or partnership with the
subsidiary.67 Therefore, if the parent and the subsidiary operate a facility in
conjunction with one another, the parent can be directly liable.68 A parent can
also be liable as a principle if the subsidiary acts as an agent of the parent when
operating the facility.69 Other theories under which a parent could be liable for the
actions of its subsidiary might be apparent authority,70 participation or
acquiescence in the subsidiary's fraud, a parent's own fraudulent conduct, a
parent's own misrepresentations concerning the actions of its subsidiary, or the
negligent failure of the parent to control its subsidiary.71
C. Previous Treatment ofParent Liability Under CERCLA § 107(a)
Parent liability has been debated by the courts since the passage of CERCLA
Mfg. Co., 893 F.2d at 83.
65See Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Polan, 939 F.2d 209, 211 (4th Cir. 1991) (discussing the
West Virginia test for veil piercing as having two elements: (1) unity of interest and (2) whether
the result would be inequitable if the veil was not pierced).
66 See AT&T Global Info. Solutions Co. v. Union Tank Car Co., 29 F. Supp. 2d 857, 867-
68 (S.D. Ohio 1998) (stating that the Ohio standard requires a lesser showing than fraud,
because the Ohio standard will allow veil piercing when an inequity or unfairness will result);
see also infra Part V.C (discussing whether federal or state common law should be applied
under CERCLA).
67 See Cordova Chem. Co., 113 F3d at 580.
68See generally NICHOLAS P. CHEREmISiNOFF & MADELYN L. GRAFFIA,
ENVIRONMENTAL AND HEALTH & SAFETY MANAGEMENT: A GUIDE TO CoMPLIANCE 26-27
(1995) (stating that one theory of liability is "concert" liability where the parent and the
subsidiary take actions in concert with one another for a common goal, a concept similar to
joint venture liability).
69 See HEIDEN, supra note 36, at 222 (suggesting that a principle-agent relationship can be
established by mutual consent between the parent and the subsidiary, by express consent of the
subsidiary, by complete domination of the subsidiary by the parent, or the complete stock
ownership of the subsidiary by the parent).
70 See id at 21 (stating that a subsidiary acts with apparent authority when its actions with
respect to a third party suggest that it is acting on behalf of the parent).
71 See id. at 29 (suggesting the above laundry list of other possible ways to find a parent
liable for the actions of its subsidiary).
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in 1980.72 The Supreme Court chose to settle the issue in Bes'ffoods.73 However,
prior to this decision, there were three different interpretations that developed and
were applied in the federal courts.74
1. The "'Actual Control" Test
Under this theory, courts reasoned that CERCLA's goal of making
responsible parties liable for clean-up costs dictated an abrogation of limited
liability for parent corporations if they "actually controlled" their subsidiary's
management and day-to-day operations.75 In fact even though CERCLA did not
expressly address the issue, CERCLA's omission was treated by the courts as a
license to ignore the corporate form to support the underlying purposes of
CERCLA.76 Courts argued that if a parent had actual control over a subsidiary's
day-to-day operations then they, the parent must also have control over the
72 See LIGHT, supra note 21, at 94-98.
73 See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998) (finding that liability under
CERCLA could be accomplished either by piercing the corporate veil or by a finding that the
parent was in actual control of the pollution facility, regardless of the parent's control of the
subsidiary).
74 See infra Part II.C.1-3. See also LIGHT, supra note 21, at 110-12 (noting that courts are
divided on the effect of CERCLA on the corporate form in the context of a parent-subsidiary
relationship). But see United States v. A&N Cleaners & Launderers, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 1317,
1331 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("[C]ourts generally resolve ambiguities in CERCLA's language in
favor of imposing the most expansive liability, citing the statute's remedial purpose").
75 See United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15, 22 (D.R.I. 1989), afid, 910
F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that a parent can be liable for the subsidiary's liability under
CERCLA without having to pierce the corporate veil if the parent has actual control over the
subsidiary). In Kayser-Roth, the court articulated factors which if present might produce a
showing of actual control by a parent. They include: if the parent controls the financial affairs of
the subsidiary, the employees of the subsidiary and their work assignments, the disposal of
hazardous wastes of the subsidiary, and if the parent is the sole owner of the subsidiary. See id.
at 22-23; see also FMC Corp. v. United States Dep't. of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 843 (3d Cir.
1994); Landsford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F3d 1209, 1221 (3d Cir.
1993). See generally James P. Demario & Donna Drewes, Does Corporate Superfund Liability
Extend to Parent Companies?, in THE 1995 EXECUTvE FILE: HOT ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 14
(M. Lee Smith ed., 1995) [hereinafter 1995 EXECUTIVE FILE] (stating that the actual control test
when applied considers the "pervasive control" of a subsidiary by a parent); LIGHT, supra note
21, at 94 (stating that the general test for liability under CERCLA looks at the level of control
the individual has over the pollution and that control of a company operating a facility can be
enough to find a parent liable).
76 See generally Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. at 22; FMC Corp., 29 F.3d at 843 ('The
actual control test imposes liability which would not be consistent with 'traditional rules of
limited liability' but nevertheless is consistent 'with CERCLA's broad remedial
purposes ..... '"); Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth., 4 F.3d at 1221.
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subsidiary's pollution policies and could have prevented in some way the ensuing
environmental harm.77 Generally, this test was very fact driven.7 8
If a parent corporation was found to be in actual control of its subsidiary, then
the parent could be liable for the actions of its subsidiary without having to meet
the traditional veil-piercing stanLdard. 79 To make such a finding of actual control,
courts would consider whether the subsidiary was wholly owned, if the
corporations shared officers, and if the parent controlled the subsidiary's policies,
procedures, and business management.80 A parent, under this approach, did not
have to control the polluting facility of the subsidiary.8' It was enough that the
parent had "actual control" over the subsidiary.82
2. The "Capacity or Authority to Control" Test
The "capacity or authority to control" test was broader than the "actual
control" test.83 Under this interpretation, a parent corporation was liable as an
77 See Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. at 22.
78 See id. Kayser-Roth listed the factors which proved actual control of a subsidiary by the
parent in that case: (1) financial control of the subsidiary, (2) restriction of the subsidiary's
budget and spending, (3) environmental affairs on behalf of the subsidiary are detem-ned by
the parent, (4) real estate transactions required parental approval, (5) dual officers were used to
control subsidiary's policies and (6) approval of capital transfers of expenditures.
79 See id. at 23 (finding that the corporate form can be "disregarded in the interest of
public convenience, fairness and equity" when a parent actually controls the management and
business affairs of its subsidiary). This court determined that under CERCLA, the corporate
structure receives no "special importance." Id. at 24; see also FMC Corp., 29 F3d at 843;
Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth., 4 F3d at 1221; LIGHT, supra note 21, at 95-96 (finding
that a parent's control of a subsidiary which operates a facility for the purposes of CERCLA is
enough to trigger liability under CERCLA).
8 0 See Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. at 22-23.
81 See LIGHT, supra note 21, at 96 (noting that under the actual control test, a parent's
liability is based on its "pervasive control" of the subsidiary regardless of the fact that the parent
might not have actually controlled the waste disposal activities of the subsidiary). But see
Colorado v. Idarado Mining Co., 18 Envtl. L. Rep. 20578,20578-79 (D. Colo. 1987) (adopting
a version of the actual control test which it patterned after the test for liability under the Clean
Water Act section 311 which focused on the parent's control of the subsidiary's facility, not the
control of the subsidiary).
82 Mark E. McKane, Comment, Operator Liability for Parent Corporations Under
CERCLA: A Return to Basics, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1642,1663 (1997) (stating that actual control
of the subsidiary is the minimum required to meet the actual control test).
83 See Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 672 (D. Idaho 1986) (articulating the
"capacity to control" test as determining that a parent will be liable when the parent had the
"capacity to prevent and abate damage"). Bunker Hill also stresses that if a parent could only be
liable as an operator under a veil-piercing standard, that would "allow the corporate veil to
frustrate congressional purpose." Id.; see also United States v. TIC Investment Corp., 68 F.3d
1082, 1086 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating that for a parent to be liable it has to have the authority to
control the actions of the subsidiary, but noting that even though it was considering arranger
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operator under CERCLA if the parent had the "capacity to control" the activities
of its subsidiary.84 Courts, using this test, were able to hold a parent liable for the
actions of a subsidiary so long as the parent could have made decisions for the
subsidiary or forced the subsidiary to take certain action desired by the parent.85
However, there was no requirement that the parent actually exert any control over
the subsidiary-it was enough that the parent could have exerted such authority
under this test.86 Opponents claimed that under this reasoning any parent who
was the sole owner of a subsidiary could be liable even if the subsidiary was
merely held as an investment, because as a sole owner, it would have the power to
control the actions of the subsidiary.87
While this approach sought to uphold CERCLA's goal of forcing those
responsible for contamination to pay for its clean up,88 this approach seemed to
fly fully in the face of traditional common law concepts of limited liability for
owners of corporations,89 because parents could be liable for merely owning a
subsidiary, and not for any actions directly taken by the parent with regard to the
contamination.90
liability under CERCLA, the test applies to operator liability, as well); Nurad, Inc. v. William E.
Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 842 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Carolina Transformer
Co., 978 F.2d 832, 836-37 (4th Cir. 1992); LIGHT, supra note 21, at 104 (stating that Bunker
Hill represented a divergence from the traditional notions of corporate separateness and limited
liability).
84 See 1995 EXECUTIVE FIE, supra note 75, at 15 (comparing the capacity to control with
the actual control test and distinguishing the capacity to control test in that the parent has the
"power to direct activities" of a subsidiary); LIGHT, supra note 21, at 97-98 (noting that under
the capacity to control test, mere ownership of a subsidiary could result in liability for the
parent). Light argues that under this test the question of whether a parent is liable as an operator
considers whether they "could affect" the disposal decisions of a subsidiary. Id. at 97.
85 See Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. at 672. The court in Bunker looked to see if the
parent had the capacity to control the hazardous waste disposal, if the parent could control the
"activities of persons who control[led]" the pollution facility, and whether the parent could
force the prevention of such pollution. Id.
86 See id. (finding the parent liable if they had the capacity to control the prevention of the
pollution, but failed to stop its release); see also LIGHT, supra note 21, at 97 (noting that this test
considers a parent's authority to control the disposal practices of the subsidiary, whether the
parent gave such authority to the subsidiary, and whether the parent had knowledge of the
subsidiary's disposal practices).
87 See LIGHT, supra note 21, at 97-98 (noting that under the capacity to control test it
would be possible for a parent to be liable for mere ownership of a subsidiary).
8 8 See supra Part I.A and accompanying text. But see LIGHT, supra note 21, at 110-11
(opining that Congress intended CERCLA to balance the interests of state corporate law and the
federal policy of environmental clean up and that CERCLA was not intended to achieve the
goal of clean up at any cost).
89 See supra Part ll.B.1 (discussing traditional limited liability).
90 See 1995 EXECUTIVE FILE, supra note 75, at 15 (stating that limited liability can be
disregarded "in the interest of public convenience, fairness, and equity"). Thus, if limited
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3. "Piercing the Corporate Veil" Test
Some courts were unconvinced by the policies that supported the other two
approaches to parent liability under CERCLA.9 1 These courts determined that
CERCLA was passed with the knowledge that owners of corporations enjoyed
the benefit of limited liability.92 CERCLA does not include parent corporations in
its definition of potentially responsible persons.93 Therefore, these courts
reasoned that without express congressional override, limited liability still existed
and any exception to limited liability required that the party bringing suit be able
to pierce the corporate veil to find the parent liable.94
These courts found that a parent was only liable under CERCLA when the
liability can be disregarded for such reasons, then a parent could be liable for merely owning a
subsidiary if it will violate public fairness and equity. But see In re Acushnet River, 675 F.
Supp. 22, 32 (D. Mass. 1987) (noting that more evidence than just a parent's ownership of the
subsidiary needed to be present to find a parent liable under CERCLA); LIGHT, supra note 21,
at 101 (noting that ownership alone would be insufficient in most cases to produce liability).
91 See United States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 113 F.3d 584, 590-91 (6th Cir. 1997); Joslyn
Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James, 893 F.2d 80, 83-84 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that a parent could only be
liable for actions of its subsidiary if the corporate veil standard was met). Some sources even
hypothesized before the decision in Bes~foods that the trend among the circuits was to move
more toward respecting the corporate form and traditional theories of limited liability unless the
corporate veil could be pierced. See 1995 ExEcuTrvE FILE, supra note 75, at 16; KOLE &
ESPEL, supra note 15, at 9 (noting that Joslyn represented a "retreat" from the expansive trend
of allowing a parent to be liable without having to meet the traditional standard for veil
piercing). However, these decisions were still among the minority position before Besyfoods.
See generally Kanie Frischknecht Brown, Note, Parent Corporation Liability for Subsidiary
Violations Under § 107 of CERCLA: Responding to United States v. Cordova Chemical Co.,
1998 BYU L. REv. 265,271 (1998).
92 See Joslyn Mfg. Co., 893 F.2d at 82-83; In re Acushnet, 675 F. Supp. at 32 (this
decision respected traditional notions of corporate common law and required that the veil-
piercing standard be met to find a parent liable); United States v. USX Corp., 68 F3d 811, 822
(3d Cir. 1995) (finding parent liability without piercing the corporate veil to be contrary to the
traditional corporate law concept, even though the court in this case did find the defendant liable
without piercing the veil).
93 See CERCLA § 101(21), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1994) (defining "person" under
CERCLA); see also KOLE & ESPEL, supra note 15, at 9 (noting that the parent corporation is
not included in the definition of persons under CERCLA). But see LIGHT, supra note 21, at 94-
95 (noting that even though corporate officers were not expressly included in the definition of
persons under CERCLA, courts have not been reluctant to find them personally liable for
actions taken by the corporation).
94 See Cordova Chem. Co., 59 F.3d at 590-91; Joslyn Mfg. Co., 893 F.2d at 82-83 (noting
that "[tihe normal rule of statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legislation to
change the interpretation of a judicially created concept [in other words, the common law], it
makes that intent specific") (citations omitted); see also KOLE & ESPEL, supra note 15, at 9
(same). But see LIGHT, supra note 21, at 94-95 (noting that even though corporate officers were
not expressly included in the definition of persons under CERCLA, courts routinely found them
personally liable for their actions in corporate pollution).
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corporate veil could be pierced.95 Therefore, under this theory, a parent could not
be directly liable as an operator for the actions of its subsidiary regardless of its
control over the subsidiary's actions or its control over the facility unless there
was a showing that the veil-piercing standard had been satisfied.96
Ill. UNITED STATES V. BESTFOODS: FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In order to fully understand the impact of United States v. Besgibods,97it is
necessary to look briefly at the facts and procedural history of this complex case
because they will provide the context in which the Supreme Court ultimately and
unanimously resolved the issue of a parent corporation's liability under
CERCLA.98 The Court's final determination on the liability of a parent under
CERCLA disagreed with the district court's analysis 9 and distinguished the
Sixth Circuit's treatment of the issue.100 Both of the lower court decisions
represented interpretations that were present in the circuits prior to the Bestfoods
decision. 101
95 See Joslyn Mfg. Co., 893 F.2d at 83. But see Schiavone v. Pearce, 79 F.3d 248, 253-54
(2d Cir. 1996) (holding that owner liability could only be attached to a parent if the veil is
pierced, but noting that a parent can be liable as an operator for its own actions in operating a
facility).
96 See 1995 EXECUTIVE FILE, supra note 75, at 16 (stating that the veil-piercing standard
for disregarding the corporate form requires a showing that the subsidiary is the alter-ego of the
parent or a unity of interest, and that a subsidiary was used by a parent to promote fraud or
injustice). A veil-piercing standard will be applied when a subsidiary is a sham designed by the
parent to avoid direct liability. See id. at 16. But see Schiavone, 79 F.3d at 253 (noting that "[a]n
interpretation of CERCLA that imposes operator liability directly on parent corporations whose
own acts violate the statute is consistent with the general thrust and purpose of [CERCLA]').
97 524 U.S. 51 (1998).
98 See generally CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994 & Supp. 11 1997).
99 See generally CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp., 777 F. Supp. 549 (W.D. Mich.
1991).
100 In Bestfoods, the Supreme Court vacated the ruling of the Court of Appeals of the
Sixth Circuit and remanded the case to the trial court for fuither proceedings in line with the
Court's final resolution. See BesOfoods, 524 U.S. at 73. See generally United States v. Cordova
Chem. Co., 113 F.3d 572 (6th Cir. 1997). In addition, the provision at the center of debate in
this decision was CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1994). This provision deals specifically
with the types of parties who can be liable under CERCLA for hazardous waste contamination.
The main issue in this controversy is whether a parent corporation qualifies as an owner or
operator of a facility if the parent owns a subsidiary who qualifies as an owner or operator and
who is liable under CERCLA. See supra Part IIA (discussing CERCLA section 107).
101 See supra Part II.C (considering the different approaches taken by the circuits in
dealing with parent liability under CERCLA).
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A. Recitation of the Facts
During the 1950s, a chemical company began manufacturing chemicals at a
site near Muskegon, Michigan. 10 2 In 1965, CPC International Inc., now known as
Bestfoods,10 3 formed a wholly owned subsidiary, Ott Chemical Company, to
purchase the assets of this Michigan chemical manufacturer. 04
While Ott was. a legally separate entity, Bestfoods did maintain control of
some management decisions within the subsidiary, such as the appointment of
Bestfood employees to positions of influence within the Ott organization. 05 For
example, Bestfoods integrated the employees (and even the sole shareholder) of
the original chemical company into the newly formed subsidiary and placed some
of these individuals on Ott's board of directors. Bestfoods then appointed the sole
shareholder of the original chemical company and an officer of Ott Chemical,
Anthony Ott, to a position on the board of directors for Bestfoods. 10 6 In addition,
throughout their relationship as parent and subsidiary, one Bestfoods employee,
G.R.D. Williams, contributed in a "significant' way to Ott's environmental
compliance policies.10 7 Therefore, Bestfoods' presence behind Ott was evident
through its control of management decisions and appointments. This arrangement
lasted until Bestfoods sold Ott Chemical to another corporation in 1972.108 That
corporation went bankrupt in 1977.109
Both the original chemical company and Ott Chemical owned and
manufactured chemicals at the Michigan facility;' 10 and, in addition, they both
had a policy of dumping hazardous wastes at this site.II The dumping of toxic
residues resulted in heavy contamination of the soil and ground water. In fact, the
site was so contaminated that when the Michigan Department of Natural
Resources evaluated the site "it found the land littered with thousands of leaking
and even exploding drums of waste, and the soil and water saturated with noxious
chemicals."1 12
The Michigan Department of Natural Resources helped the bankrupt
company that had purchased Ott Chemical find a buyer for the site who was
102 See Besyfoods, 524 U.S. at 56 (noting that the original chemical company was also
named Ott Chemical Company).
103 See id. at56 n.3.
104 See id. at56.
105 See id. at 56-57.
106 See id.
107 See id. at 59.
10 8 See id. at 57.
109 See id.
I10 Seeid at 57-58.
111 See id.
112 Id. at 57.
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willing to help with the clean-up CoSts. 1 13 The buyer was a wholly owned
subsidiary, Cordova/Michigan, Inc., which was owned by Cordova/Califomia,
Inc. Cordova/California was in turn the wholly owned subsidiary of Aerojet-
General Corporation. 114 These facts are only relevant because while
Cordova/Michigan continued to manufacture chemicals at the site, it did not add
to the environmental damage and indeed did help with the initial clean-up costs of
the site. However, the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) became
involved with the clean up under CERCLA and re-estimated the clean-up costs to
be much more than originally anticipated. In fact, they were estimated to be "well
into the tens of millions of dollars."115 Under CERCLA, the federal government
is permitted to recoup the costs of environmental clean up from specific parties
that are potentially responsible for the environmental harm 1 16 In 1989, the United
States filed suit naming as defendants Bestfoods, the only shareholder of the
original chemical company (Anthony Ott), the current owner
(Cordova/Michigan) and its parent corporations (Cordova/California and Aerojet-
General).1 17 The Supreme Court only discussed CERCLA liability for Bestfoods
in its role as the parent of a subsidiary.
B. Distict Court's Analysis
The District Court for the Western District of Michigan held Bestfoods liable
as an "operator" because it, as a parent corporation, "actively participat[ed]" in the
affairs of its subsidiary, Ott Chemical. 18 CERCLA imposes liability on past and
present operators of facilities.119 The district court found that Bestfoods was liable
as an "operator" under the CERCLA definition because Bestfoods had "actively
participated" in the management of Ott Chemical, and because Ott was the
operator of the Michigan site.120 In reaching this conclusion, the district court
113 See id.
114 See id
115 See id at 57 n.5.
116 See CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1994) (defining the four categories of
potentially liable parties); see also supra note 21 and accompanying text.
117 See Besgfoods, 524 U.S. at 57-58 (noting that the government filed suit against five
potentially liable defendants: Bestfoods, Aerojet-General, its wholly owned subsidiaries, and
the owner of the original chemical corporation, Anthony Ott The subsidiary of Bestfoods, Ott
Chemical, was no longer in existence at the time of the suit).
118 CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp., 777 F. Supp. 549, 573 (W.D. Mich. 1991);
see also Besifoods, 524 U.S. at 58-59 (considering the district court's analysis).
119 See CERCLA § 107(aX2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1994). The parties in this case stipulated
that the Michigan site was indeed a facility within the CERCLA definition and that there was
hazardous waste contamination which made CERCLA applicable; see also Besfoods, 524 U.S.
at 58-59.
120 See Aerojet-General, 777 F. Supp. at 573. See supra Part Il.C.1 (discussing the "actual
2000]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
found that Bestfoods and its subsidiary shared officers and directors, and that
Bestfoods' employees contributed to Ott's environmental policies and made other
executive decisions for the subsidiary significant in finding the parent liable.121
According to the district court, a parent could be liable as an operator by "actively
participating in and exercising control over the subsidiary's business during a
period of disposal of hazardous waste," 122 but could not be liable if it was merely
exercising oversight functions to protect its investment.12 3
C. Sixth Circuit's Analysis
The Sixth Circuit rejected the district court's analysis and held that Bestfoods
was not liable as an operator under CERCLA because of the traditional common
law notion that owners of corporations are entitled to limited liability, regardless
of whether the owner is a shareholder or another corporation. 124 When analyzing
CERCLA's definition of persons, section 101(21),125 the Sixth Circuit did not
find parent corporations to be expressly, included in the definition of persons for
the statute's purposes.' 26 The court noted that one rule of statutory interpretation
states that common law concepts are not abrogated by congressional statutes
unless the statute specifically expresses such an intention.127 Therefore, the
majority held that a parent corporation could not be directly liable as an
"operator" under CERCLA due to the common law notion of limited liability.128
A parent corporation, according to the Sixth Circuit, could only be derivatively
liable as an operator if "the requirements necessary to pierce the corporate veil are
met."
129
The Sixth Circuit held that Bestfoods was not liable under CERCLA because
its corporate veil was not pierced.130 The court applied the Michigan veil-piercing
control" test).
121 SeeAerojet-General, 777 F. Supp. at 573.
1221Id.
123 See id.
124 See United States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 113 F.3d 572, 579-80 (6th Cir. 1997). See
supra Part II.B.1 (discussing limited liability).
125 See CERCLA § 101(21), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1994); see also supra note 22 for the
text of this section.
126 See Cordova Chem. Co., 113 F.3d at 579.
127 See id. at 580 (according to the decision there is a strong presumption that when a
statute does not address an issue, then the common law applies); see also United States v.
Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 62-63 (1998) (agreeing with this general presumption).
12 8 See Cordova Chem. Co., 113 F.3d at 580. See generally Bes~foods, 524 U.S. at 58-59
(considering the Sixth Circuit's analysis).
129 Cordova Chem. Co., 113 F.3d at 580. See generally supra Part J.B.l.a (defining and
discussing the concept of "piercing the corporate veil").
130 See Cordova Chem. Co., 113 F3d at 580-81.
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standard 131 which requires not only a showing of unity of interest but also a
showing that the subsidiary was used by the parent to perpetuate fraud.132 Since
Bestfoods respected corporate formalities by treating Ott as a separate entity, and
since there was no evidence of fraud or injustice, the Sixth Circuit determined that
the state veil-piercing standard was not satisfied.133
IV. UNTED STATES V. BESTFOODS: THE SUPREME COURT SETTLES THE
SPLIT
The Supreme Court in Bestfoods134 held that a corporate parent cannot be
derivatively liable as an operator unless the corporate veil can be pierced.135 The
Court declined to address whether the veil had been pierced in this case, because
the parties had not addressed that issue on appeal. Therefore, the Sixth Circuit's
decision holding that Bestfoods was not derivatively liable under Michigan veil-
piercing standards still applied.136
Yet the Supreme Court added a twist: The Court disagreed with the Sixth
Circuit's analysis and found that there is another way a parent corporation can be
liable under CERCLA. A parent corporation can be directly liable as an operator
if they operate the facility themselves. 137
Therefore, the "actual control" test articulated by some circuits will no longer
be applicable because under that test a parent could be liable if the parent
controlled the subsidiary's business or management without regard to whether the
parent controlled the facility.138 Thus, according to the Supreme Court, the key to
131 See id.; see also infra Part V.C (considering whether state or federal veil-piercing law
should be applied under CERCLA).
132 See Cordova Chem. Co., 113 F3d at 580.
133 See id.
134 United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998).
135 See id. at 63-64 (agreeing with the Sixth Circuit that only when the corporate veil can
be pierced may a corporate parent be derivatively liable under CERCLA).
136 See id. at 64 n.9 (listing conflicting case law that has addressed the issue of state versus
federal veil-piercing standards for derivative liability under CERCLA, but declining to make a
decision on which common law should be applied in this circumstance, because the issue was
not addressed by the parties. Therefore, the finding of the Sixth Circuit that Besfoods, was not
derivatively liable as an operator under Michigan veil-piercing standards still applies in this
case); see also infra Part V.C.
137 See Besifoods, 524 U.S. at 68 (finding that liability as an operator in this case should
depend on the "relationship between [Bestfoods] and the Muskegon facility itself'); see also
Schiavone v. Pearce, 79 F.3d 248, 254 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that direct liability as an operator
can be attached to a parent corporation if they control the polluting facility).
138 See Besoods, 524 U.S. at 66 (finding that the actual control test confuses direct and
indirect liability of a parent corporation because it is "administered by asking a question about
the relationship between the two corporations (an issue going to indirect liability) instead of a
question about the parent's interaction with the subsidiary's facility (the source of any direct
20001
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
finding a parent corporation directly liable as an operator is that the parent must
operate the facility.139
A. Derivative Liability Under Bes~foods
Under Besifoods, a parent corporation can only be derivatively liable under
CERCLA if the corporate veil can be pierced.14 0 The Court found that CERCLA
does not expressly "rewrite" the traditional common law concept of limited
liability.141 Therefore, because limited liability is just as applicable to a parent-
subsidiary relationship as it is to a corporation-shareholder relationship, a parent
cannot be liable unless an exception to limited liability applies, or, in other words,
unless the corporate veil can be pierced.142
The Supreme Court found that veil piercing is a "fundamental principle of
corporate law" that can be applied to find a parent derivatively liable for the
actions of its subsidiary when "the corporate form would otherwise be misused to
accomplish certain wrongful purposes, most notably fraud, on the [parent's]
behalf."143 Therefore, for a parent to be derivatively liable under CERCLA, as in
other circumstances without statutory abrogation, the corporate veil has to be
pierced.144
liability)").
139 See id. at 66-68 ('The question is not whether the parent operates the subsidiary, but
rather whether it operates the facility... "); see also United States v. Brighton, 153 F3d 307,
313-14 (6th Cir. 1998) (stating that operator liability can be direct liability when the parent
corporation exercises control over the polluting or contaminated facility). This case follows
Bestfoods and remands the case for a factual determination of whether the parent was an
operator in this case. See id at 316.
140 See Besyfoods, 524 U.S. at 62-67 ('The Court of Appeals was accordingly correct in
holding that when (but only when) the corporate veil may be pierced, may a parent corporation
be charged with derivative CERCLA liability for its subsidiary's actions").
141 See id. at 62 ("Nothing in CERCLA purports to rewrite this well-settled rule, either");
see also Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80, 83 (5th Cir. 1990) ("[A]ny bold
rewriting of corporation law in this area [of parent liability] is best left to Congress). For a
view of the Supreme Court's treatment of congressional silence in other areas, see generally
Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 266-67 (1979), which states
that "silence is most eloquent, for such reticence while contemplating an important and
controversial change in existing law is unlikely."
142 See Besfoods, 524 U.S. at 62.
143 See id. at 62-63.
144 See id at 63 ("CERCLA is thus like many other congressional enactments in giving no
indication that 'the entire corpus of state corporation law is to be replaced simply because a
plaintiffs cause of action is based upon a federal statute, ... and the failure of the statute to
speak to a matter as fundamental as the liability implications of corporate ownership demands
application of the rule that '[i]n order to abrogate a common-law principle, the statute must
speak directly to the question addressed by the common law .... ") (citations omitted); see
also Joslyn Mfg. Co., 893 F.2d at 83 ('Without an express Congressional directive to the
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The Court declined to decide whether state or federal veil-piercing standards
should be applied in this context because the issue was not addressed by the
parties on appeal.145 This omission by the Court leaves lower courts to determine
which law to apply to parent-subsidiary relationships under CERCLA. The
Comment will explore this issue in Part V.C. 146
Finally, the Court stated that derivative liability can apply to a parent as both
an owner and operator under CERCLA when the veil is pierced.147 Thus, if a
subsidiary operates a facility that is owned by another party, the parent can be
derivatively liable as an operator if the corporate veil can be pierced. This point
dispelled some of the prior commentary on the issue, which speculated that
operator liability was direct liability and owner liability was derivative liability.148
By emphasizing this point, the. Court made it clear that mere ownership of a
subsidiary is not important by itself to liability under CERCLA, but that the
standards of veil piercing need to be met unless the parent is taking actions for
itself which constitute the operation of a facility.
B. Direct Liability Under Besqfoods
The majority of the Besifoods opinion addressed the issue of direct liability of
a parent corporation under CERCLA. 149 The Court made clear that a parent
contrary, common law principles of corporation law, such as limited liability, govern our
court's analysis.).
This concept has been extended to other contexts outside of CERCLA regulation. See, eg.,
United States v. Dell'Aquilla, 150 F.3d 329 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding that Besfoods' derivative
operator liability standard for a parent corporation also applies in the context of the Clean Air
Act); Papa v. Katy Indus., 166 F3d 937 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding that derivative liability can
exist under other federal statutes such as the Americans With Disabilities Act); United States v.
Green, 33 F. Supp. 2d 203 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (applying Bestfood's derivative liability analysis to
corporate shareholders who managed a company, but did not make decisions concerning the
corporation's hazardous waste disposal practices).
14 5 See Besfoods, 524 U.S. at 63 n.9.
14 6 See also supra Part 1l.B.1 (discussing the differences in veil-piercing standards in
different jurisdictions).
14 7 See BesOfoods, 524 U.S. at 64 (hypothesizing that if a subsidiary operates a facility
without ownership and the subsidiary is so controlled by its parent for improper purposes that
veil piercing is waranted, then the parent can only be derivatively liable as an operator of the
facility, not an owner. However, a parent could be derivatively liable as an owner if veil
piercing was warranted and the subsidiary was the owner of the facility).
148 See generally Schiavone v. Pearce, 79 F.3d 248, 253-54 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that a
parent can only be liable as an owner if the corporate veil can be pierced and liable as an
operator if the parent actually operated the facility, without regard to its control of the
subsidiary); United States v. USX Corp., 68 F3d 811, 823 (3d Cir. 1995); Lansford-Coaldale
Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F3d 1209, 1220 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. Kayser-
Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15 (D. I1. 1989), affd., 910 F.2d 24,27 (1st Cir. 1990).
149 See Besfoods, 524 U.S. at 51.
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corporation can only be derivatively liable when the corporate veil can be pierced
under corporate common law.150 However, the Court stated that a corporate
parent can also be liable in another way. A parent can be directly liable as an
operator under CERCLA if the parent controls the "facility" that produces or
contains the hazardous waste exposure.151 The key to direct liability, according to
the Court, is that the parent must exercise actual control over the facility (without
regard for the parent's control of its subsidiary). Therefore, the Court makes clear
that for Bestfoods to be directly liable the "analysis should... have rested on the
relationship between [Bestfoods] and the Muskegon facility itself."'' 52
Direct liability under CERCLA can apply to any "person' who "operates" a
"facility."' 153 To reach this conclusion, one must note that corporations, in general,
are included under the definition of persons who can be operators or owners
under CERCLA, 154 and a parent corporation is by definition a corporation.
Therefore, if a parent corporation sufficiently operates any facility, then it can be
held liable as an operator for the clean-up costs associated with that facility
(regardless of whether its subsidiary owns the facility in question).' 55 In addition,
since the parent is operating the facility, it can be viewed as a more responsible
entity so that we worry less about imposing the clean-up costs on it, as opposed to
a parent who merely owns a subsidiary, but takes no affirmative action of its own
to contribute to the hazardous conditions.156
The Court also established a standard for determining whether a parent
corporation is directly liable for the operation of a facility. The Court reasoned
150 See id. at 62--64.
151 See id at 64 ("[N]othing in [CERCLA's] terms bars a parent corporation from direct
liability for its own actions in operating a facility owned by its subsidiary"); see also Donahey
v. Livingstone, 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998) (following the definition of "operator" articulated in
Bes#foods); United States v. Brighton, 153 F.3d 307, 314 (6th Cir. 1998) (same). See generally
Amatek Inc. v. Pioneer Salt. 709 F. Supp. 556, 559 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (noting in a case which is a
prelude to Besifoods, that operator liability is based on the "degree" of control of an individual
entity over the facility); LIGHT, supra note 21, at 98-99 (looking to the Clean Water Act as an
analogy). Light notes that section 311 of the Clean Water Act holds individuals liable if they are
in charge of a facility. See id.; see also Colorado v. Idarado Mining Co., 707 F. Supp. 1227 (D.
Colo. 1989) (adopting liability test based on the test in the Clean Water Act).
15 2 Be~sflods, 524 U.S. at 66-68.
153 CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994).
154 See CERCLA § 101(21), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1994); see also Schiavone v. Pearce,
79 F.3d 248, 254-55 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that corporations as entities are included in the
definition of person under CERCLA, so if a parent corporation operates a facility it can be held
directly liable under CERCLA).
155 See Besyfoods, 524 U.S. 64-65 (stating that if a facility is owned by a subsidiary, but
the parent corporation operates the facility, then the parent can be directly liable for its actions).
156 Thus, this ruling seems to comply with the actual goal of CERCLA to hold those
responsible for the pollution liable for the costs. Under this approach, a parent is liable for its
own actions in operating a facility, and not the actions of its subsidiary.
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that an operator under CERCLA is an entity that "directs the workings of,
manages, or conducts the affairs of a facility" '1 57 or more specifically "manage[s],
direct[s], or conduct[s] operations... related to pollution. .... 158
Some guideposts were articulated by the Court to determine what actions
would constitute the operation of a facility under the established standard. Courts,
under this analysis, should consider whether a parent "manage[d], direct[ed], or
conduct[ed]" operations at the facility such as "disposal of hazardous waste, or
decisions about compliance with environmental regulations."'1 59
However, the Court cautioned that actions of joint officers and board
members (members of both the subsidiary and the parent) are presumed to be
attributable to the entity for which the individual is acting at the time the action is
taken.160 Therefore, an action taken by a joint officer who is working in his
capacity as an employee for the parent would probably be insufficient by itself to
assign direct liability to the parent corporation 61 unless "norms of corporate
157 Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 66-67 (finding that CERCLA intended "operator" to be defined
in the "organizational sense' of the word which means to "conduct the affairs of' or "manage'
a facility).
158 Id at66.
159 Id at 66-70; see also United States v. Brighton, 153 F.3d 307, 315 (6th Cir. 1998)
(finding that the government can be liable as an operator if its regulatory actions over a facility
are extensive enough to go beyond mere oversight and constitute management of the facility);
North Shore Gas Co. v. Salomon, Inc., 152 F.3d 642, 648-49 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that a
parent is directly liable if it manages or directs the operations of a facility that are specifically
related to pollution, regardless of whether the parent also manages the subsidiary); Schiavone v.
Pearce, 79 F.3d 248, 255 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that the court in this case would have
considered as evidence of a parent's control of a facility whether the parent's employees
negotiated a renewal contract for the continued operation of the facility, and whether the
parent's employees controlled the capital expenditures of the facility).
In addition, see Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Ter Maat, 13 F. Supp. 2d 756 (N.D. Il. 1998), a
recent federal decision that applies the direct liability test of Bestoods to find a parent
corporation liable under CERCLA. The evidence in Browning showed that there were
communications (letters) between waste transporters of the subsidiary's facility and the parent
corporation concerning activities at the facility. The subsidiary also paid the parent a
management fee to conduct administrative functions at the facility. In addition, the president of
the parent corporation (acting in his capacity as the parent president and not as director for the
subsidiary) communicated with the Illinois EPA concerning the facility, with another Illinois
agency to obtain a noise permit for the facility, and with an environmental consultant of the
parent about clean-up efforts at the facility. See id. at 763. Citing this evidence, the District
Court found that the parent was directly liable as an operator of a facility.
However, the court did not find the parent's president liable because the corporate veil was
not capable of being pierced. The court's analysis rested on the state veil-piercing standard of
Illinois as the state of incorporation. See id. at 763.
160 See Besfoods, 524 U.S. at 66-67.
161 See id at 69 ("[C]ourts generally presume 'that the directors are wearing their
subsidiary hats and not their parent hats when acting for the subsidiary' therefore, actions by
dual officers are insufficient to attribute direct liability to a parent) (citations omitted).
2000]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
behavior" reveal that such an action will significantly harm a subsidiary, yet
benefit the parent 162
In addition, the Supreme Court also suggests that actions taken by an
employee of the parent, who does not also serve the subsidiary, might be enough
to hold a parent directly liable, if the actions would be considered "controlling or
managing a facility."1 63 Yet the Court cautions that mere oversight actions by a
parent are insufficient to assign direct liability to it; thus, corporate norms
distinguishing oversight activities and operating activities are extremely important
to this determination. 164 The Court wrote: "The critical question is whether, in
degree and detail, actions directed to the facility by an agent of the parent alone
are eccentric under accepted norms of parental oversight of a subsidiary's
facility." 165 The Court hypothesized, without coming to a conclusion in this case,
that the actions taken by the employee of the parent, G.RD. Williams (who was
not a joint officer), might rise to the level of direct liability for a parent According
to the Supreme Court, the district court had found that Williams was "directly
involved" with the subsidiary's environmental policies and had "contror' over its
environmental considerations. 166 However, the Supreme Court left such a factual
question for the trial court to determine on remand.167
V. THE IMPACT OF THE DECISION
The Court's decision in United States v. Besifoods will change the law in this
area, especially for those circuits which were using the "actual control" or
"authority to control" tests to determine operator liability for a parent corporation
under CERCLA. Yet the law will also change for those circuits which only found
operator liability when the corporate veil was capable of being pierced.168 With
such changes, it is important to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the
162 See id. at 71. ("[A] director might depart so far from the norms of parental influence
exercised through dual officeholding as to serve the parent, even when ostensibly acting on
behalf of the subsidiary in operating the facility," and when this happens a parent can be
directly liable for the actions of a dual officer).
163 See id. at 71; see also Schiavone v. Pearce, 79 F.3d 248, 255 (2d Cir. 1996)
(suggesting that actions taken by employees of a parent in controlling a facility or its operation
can make the parent directly liable).164 See Besgfoods, 524 U.S. at 71 (stating that mere oversight by a parent employee must
be distinguished from operating the facility of the subsidiary).
165 Id. at 72.
166 Id. at 72-74; see also CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp., 777 F. Supp. 549, 561
(W.D. Mich. 1991).167 SeeBesoods, 524 U.S. at 72-73.
168 See United States v. Brighton, 153 F3d 307, 313-14 (6th Cir. 1998) (stating that it
follows Bes~foods' determination that a parent can be directly liable if it controls or manages a
facility of its subsidiary); North Shore Gas Co. v. Salomon, Inc., 152 F.3d 642, 648-49 (7th Cir.
1998).
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Supreme Court's approach and determine what issues will be important in the
flture for parent liability under CERCLA.
A. Veil Piercingfor Derivative Liability
Under Besgoods, a parent can be derivatively liable as an operator or owner
only when a showing is made that the subsidiary is the alter-ego of the parent,
and, in some jurisdictions, that the subsidiary has been used to perpetrate fraud or
avoid personal liabilities. 169 While this might be considered a disappointing
decision for environmental advocates because it makes it more difficult to find a
parent corporation-which may have deeper pockets than the subsidiary-
derivatively liable, it was probably correct since it complies with the rules of
statutory interpretation and traditional notions of limited liability.
1. Reasons Why Bestfoods Is Correct About Derivative Liability
There are several reasons why the Court was correct in deciding that
derivative liability for a parent under CERCLA could only occur when the facts
were present to justify piercing the corporate veil. First, this decision upholds the
common law tradition of limited liability by treating the parent and the subsidiary
as separate entities unless the parent is going beyond mere ownership of its
subsidiary and is, in reality, the same entity.170 By respecting this common law
tradition, corporations who own a subsidiary, but are merely using an oversight
function, cannot be found liable for the hannful actions of a subsidiary absent
some affirmative action on the part of the parent to contribute to the
contamination.' 71 In today's corporate world, it is a very possible scenario that a
parent could own a subsidiary merely as an investment, and exercise no control
over the subsidiary's operations or even have any knowledge of the subsidiary's
environmental polices. Under Besfoods, such corporations are protected like any
other shareholder by limited liability principles. 172
169 See Besyfoods, 524 U.S. at 62--64.
170 See id; see also supra Part Il.B.l.a (discussing various factors that tend to lead to the
piercing of a corporate veil, among them a showing that the subsidiary is the parent's alter-ego).
171 See Bes (oods, 524 U.S. at 70 (discussing the role of corporate norms as providing the
limits for a parent's direct liability under the control of a facility test). "Just as we may look to
such [corporate] norms in identifying the limits of the presumption that a dual officeholder acts
in his ostensible capacity, so here we may refer to them in distinguishing a parental officer's
oversight of a subsidiary from such an officer's control over the operation of a subsidiary's
facility." Id at 71; see also Schiavone v. Pearce, 79 F.3d 248, 254 (2d Cir. 1996).
172 See generally Bes foods, 524 U.S. at 51. Yet proponents of the actual control test could
argue that such an individual would be protected under that test as well. Since the actual control
test considers whether the parent had actual control over the subsidiary's actions, a parent such
as this might not be liable if they failed to exert control over the day-to-day operations of the
subsidiary. But, the question still remains: What if the parent did manage one portion of the
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Because CERCLA was passed in 1980 and did not directly address the issue
of parent liability, 173 it can be argued that CERCLA was enacted with the
knowledge that limited liability existed for parent corporations. 174 It can be
assumed that because Congress was aware of the presumption of limited liability
and did not address the issue of parent liability in the statute, that it intended for
limited liability to apply to parent corporations even under CERCLA. 175 Under
traditional corporate common law, the main exception to limited liability-
piercing the corporate veil-was a way in which a parent could be found
derivatively liable for actions of its subsidiary. 176 Thus, if limited liability applies
even under CERCLA, then the way to find a parent derivatively liable under
CERCLA is to pierce the corporate veil.177 Therefore, this logic leads to the
conclusion that the Court was correct with its decision in Besfoods, even if it
appears to go against the Congressional purpose of CERCLA1 78
Another strength to this approach is that the veil-piercing standard, while not
uniform for all jurisdictions, does require a higher standard of proof by the party
bringing suit than the "actual control" or "authority to control" tests. 179 Under a
veil-piercing approach, courts must consider a laundry list of factors to first make
a finding that the subsidiary and the parent are indeed alter-egos of one
another.180 This standard requires the court to determine whether the parent and
subsidiary's activities? For example, consider the following factual scenario: A subsidiary
investment is not making the expected retum for the parent and the parent seeks to remedy the
inefficient behavior by taking control of the subsidiary's finances. Under the actual control test,
the parent could be liable even if the parent had no connection to any environmental aspects of
the subsidiary and had not even attempted to control the subsidiary's policy in that area. These
are the corporations that the decision in Bestfoods protects the most: parent companies who are
exercising limited control over the conduct of a subsidiary without any control in the
environmental compliance realm. In some respects, this seems more like the situation of
traditional stockholders-in which control is not vested in the same hands as ownership. Thus,
these parents seem less responsible for the clean-up costs.
173 See CERCLA § 101(21), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1994) (defining "persons" under
CERCLA, but failing to specifically include parent corporations); supra Part IIA.
174 See Besifoods, 524 U.S. at 61.
17 5 See id. at 52. (stating that "CERCLA does not purport to reject this bedrock principle
[of limited liability for parent corporations] .... and against this venerable common law
backdrop, the Congressional silence is audible").
176 See supra Part ll.B.l.a (defining and discussing "piercing the corporate veil").
177 See supra Part II.B.1. See generally United States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 113 F3d
572, 590-91 (6th Cir. 1997); Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., Inc., 893 F.2d 80, 83 (5th
Cir. 1990).
178 See Bes(foods, 524 U.S. at 62-65. See generally supra Part Hl.A (discussing
CERCLA's goals).
17 9 See supra Part II.C.1-2 (discussing the actual control and capacity to control tests for
parent liability under CERCLA prior to Besfoods).
180 See supra Part II.B.l.a.i (discussing the factors that courts consider when determining
if a subsidiary is an alter-ego for the parent).
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the subsidiary commingled funds, whether the parent had the right to obligate the
subsidiary, whether the parent was the only entity with which the subsidiary did
business, and whether the parent actually conducted business affairs for the
subsidiary so as to benefit the parent. 181
While similar factors might be considered under the actual control test, that
test required a lesser showing.' 82 For example, a court could find that in most
aspects the parent respected the corporate for--the two corporations kept
separate accounts and financial books; the parent required that the subsidiary have
a board of directors and corporate board meetings; the parent had no control over
the subsidiary's business activities or its right to contract; the parent did not
finance the subsidiary or drain it of assets; and the parent allowed the subsidiary
to hire and fire its own employees183-but because the parent implemented a
production process into the subsidiary's daily operations, that parent might be in
actual control of the subsidiary, and thus, liable.184 In contrast, under a veil-
piercing standard, to find that a subsidiary is an alter-ego of a parent, the required
showing is higher: Few if any corporate formalities are respected, most aspects of
the two corporations are commingled, and the subsidiary's actions are routinely
for the benefit of the parent and not its own best interest. 185 In addition, in
jurisdictions that require a showing that the subsidiary is being used for fraudulent
purposes, the veil-piercing standard is heightened even more.186 Also, it is
obvious that the veil-piercing standard requires a higher showing of proof than
actual control test or capacity to control tests. Otherwise, courts would have
adopted a veil-piercing standard under CERCLA and would not have formulated
an entirely new test to circumvent the traditional principle of limited liability.
Therefore, under the Bestfoods requirements, parents are more protected from
liability and less likely to be held derivatively liable under CERCLA-a result
which appears to be more closely in line with other areas of law where there is not
express abrogation of limited liability.' 87
Finally, this new standard also abides by traditional rules for statutory
interpretation of congressional silence. Under these rules, the common law should
181 See supra note 60 (listing the factors to be considered under the alter-ego test).
182 See supra Part II.C.1; supra note 78.
18 3 See supra Part I.C.1 (performing a similar discussion of the factors included under the
actual control test); supra note 75.
184 See generally CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp., 777 F. Supp. 549, 573 (W.D.
Mich. 1991) (finding that actual control was established in similar, but not identical
circumstances to the ones proposed).
185 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
186 See AT&T Global Info. Solutions v. Union Tank Car Co., 29 F. Supp. 2d 857 (S.D.
Ohio 1998) (determining that the Ohio veil-piercing standard requires a lesser showing than
fraud).
187 See KL.IN & COFFEE, supra note 13, at 139-41.
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be upheld in the absence of express congressional intent.1 88 The Court does make
it clear that if Congress actually intended to hold parent corporations liable
without requiring that the corporate veil be pierced, then CERCLA could be
amended to expressly include parent corporations in the list of persons which are
potentially responsible parties-thus, expressly abrogating limited liability for
parents under CERCLA.' 89 Therefore, if Congress feels that a parent corporation
should be liable in this situation, then Congress could amend CERCLA
accordingly to achieve this goal.190
2. The Negative Side ofDerivative Liability Under Bestfoods
While the Court was correct in requiring that the corporate veil be pierced to
find a parent corporation derivatively liable under CERCLA, there are some
negative consequences to this decision. For example, by requiring a more narrow
standard to achieve derivative liability, the Court in this case has in some respects
stifled the goal of CERCLA. 191 CERCLA's goal is to force those who
contributed to the contamination of a facility to internalize the costs of its clean
up.' 92 Under Besfoods, this goal can be circumvented by careful parents who use
dual officers to dictate the subsidiary's environmental policies; who respect
corporate formalities, but informally operate the subsidiary and its facility though
mandatory advice; and who control the subsidiary's management and policy
decisions concerning certain activities which relate to environmental
considerations, but which would not be considered direct control over the facility
in question.' 93 Therefore, under this approach, parent corporations can use a
188 See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 61-62 (1998); see also Edmonds v.
Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 266-67 (1979) (stating that statutory
silence should not be interpreted to override common law).
189 See Besfoods, 524 U.S. at 62-63; Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80,
83 (5th Cir. 1990) (suggesting that Congress is free to change this liability if it really intended
CERCLA to abrogate limited liability for parent corporations).
190 See generally Besifoods, 524 U.S. 51.
191 See Brown, supra note 91, at 279 (discussing the Cordova decision on the issue of
parent liability (which the Court discusses approvingly in Bestfoods) as "completely
undermin[ing] the purposes of CERCLA").
192 See supra Part hIA.
193 See Brown, supra note 91, at 279 (suggesting that parents can benefit from controlling
subsidiaries without worrying about liability under a decision that requires a veil-piercing
standard). Here is an example of what might occur under this decision: A parent corporation
could dictate the production process a subsidiary will use in its daily operations. The production
process the parent chooses results in hazardous waste residues. The parent does not tell,
mandate, or even advise the subsidiary how to deal with the waste, so that it cannot be
considered in control of the waste itself. The parent also respects all other corporate formalities,
except that it leaves the subsidiary with only a limited budget every year, because it uses joint
officers acting in their capacity as agents for the subsidiary to pay dividends to the parent on a
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subsidiary to undertake all the environmentally risky activities which the parent
will wish to avoid out of fear of liability. Thus, so long as the corporate form is
respected, especially when considering the presumption about joint officers and
directors, 194 a parent will not be liable even if the subsidiary does not have the
resources to absorb the costs of clean up.195 Therefore, under Bestfoods, a party
which is arguably responsible in some way for the contamination can avoid,
legally, the liability and force the government and taxpayers to bear the costs. 19 6
The Court did seem to recognize this drawback to its decision, and thus,
disagreed with the circuits who would hold a parent liable only if the corporate
veil was pierced. 197 Besfoods does allow for parent corporations to be directly
liable for their own actions in operating a facility.198 Thus, sometimes, parents
who are trying to avoid liability by using a subsidiary will be liable if the parents
take too much control over the facility's operation and management
B. The Potential Benefits ofDirect Liability Under Bestfoods
As previously addressed, the Supreme Court in Bestfoods required that the
corporate veil be pierced to find a parent derivatively liable which makes the
standard more difficult than some of the circuits had previously anticipated.
However, the Court also held that a parent corporation can be directly liable under
CERCLA if it controls a subsidiary's facility. 199 This approach forces courts to
consider the relationship between the facility and who is in control of the facility,
regular basis. The parent then invests the dividends into itself, which it is legally allowed to do.
Because of this, the subsidiary cannot afford to implement the top-of-the-line waste prevention
methods that have developed for its industry. Contamination occurs as a result of the
subsidiary's factory site. The parent in this situation will legally not be responsible for the clean
up, because it respected the corporate form enough to avoid liability. It is, though, arguably
responsible in some way for the contamination. However, unless a court finds that
implementing a production process gives rise to control of the facility for a finding of direct
liability, the parent will avoid liability altogether and the site's clean up will be left to the
taxpayers.
194 See Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 70 (discussing the presumption that joint officers are
deemed to be acting for the entity for which their action is taken, even if the action does not
benefit that entity in reality).
195 See KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 13, at 140 (stating that undercapitalization of a
subsidiary is an important consideration under a test for veil piercing, but that it is not sufficient
in and of itself to justify piercing the corporate veil).
196 See generally Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 51 (noting that a parent will not be derivatively
liable unless the corporate veil can be pierced).
197 See id. at 67 (rejecting the Sixth Circuit's determination in Cordova Chem. Co. that a
parent can be liable only when the veil is pierced).
198 See id. at 65-67.
199 See id
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and to analyze what role the parent plays in that relationship.200 This holding
compliments its decision on derivative liability and gives the party bringing suit
another alternative with which to seek liability. Thus, if the party cannot meet the
veil-piercing standard being applied, this decision ensures that parents who
actually operate a facility are liable, regardless of whether they are in sufficient
control of the subsidiary to wan-ant derivative liability.
1. Benefits ofBestfoods 'Approach to Direct Liability
The first benefit to allowing a parent to be directly liable for its own actions is
that it also respects the notion of limited liability 201 A parent under this decision
is not liable for the actions of a subsidiary without meeting the veil-piercing
standard, but a parent is liable for its own actions202 Entities are usually, even
considering limited liability concepts, liable for their own actions.203 This
decision respects and upholds that principle.
With this approach, the Court also permits CERCLA's goal-making those
responsible for the contamination liable for its costs-to be realized, even while
respecting traditional notions of limited liability2 04 For example, if an entity is
controlling, or managing a facility-a subsidiary's facility or any facility for that
matter-then under the language of CERCLA, that entity is indeed responsible
for the contamination which occurs.205 The assumption underlying this policy is
that if the entity was controlling or managing a facility, then it controlled the
facility's environmental policies directly or indirectly, and this would be enough
for the entity to be liable under CERCLA.206 Since, under this scenario, a parent
would be liable for the costs of the contamination, Besifoods is arguably
furthering the goal of CERCLA.
In addition, this approach also seems to comply with the language of section
107(a). Section 107(a) states that any person who is (or was) an "operator" of a
"facility" can be liable under CERCLA.20 7 A parent can be an operator of a
facility, regardless of who owns the facility, if the parent corporation acts in such
a way that it is deemed to be managing or directing the facility.20 8 One action
which might give rise to such a finding is if an employee for the parent was
200 See id. at 67-71.
201 See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing limited liability).
202 See Besyfoods, 524 U.S. at 63-65.
203 See id
204 See id. at 65-67.
205 See id.; CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994).
206 See Besyfoods, 524 U.S. at 66 (discussing the definition of an operator as being in the
"operational" sense of the word, thus, an entity is liable if it is "manag[ing], direct[ing], or
conduct[ing] operations" of a facility).
207 See CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994).
208 See Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 66.
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authorized to make ultimate decisions for the subsidiary on issues of
environmental policy.209
2. Concerns About Bestfoods 'Approach to Direct Liability
While this decision permits parents to be directly liable when they control a
facility, this test arguably can allow a parent corporation to avoid liability by
merely controlling the subsidiary, but not controlling the operation of the facility
directly. For example, as the Supreme Court noted, if dual officers exist between
the parent and the subsidiary, the actions of the officers are attributed to the
corporation for which the action is taken, even if it is not for the benefit of that
entity in reality 210 Therefore, a parent corporation could actually control a facility
through such dual officers, and so long as the dual officers respect corporate
norms and formalities and appear to act in their capacities as officers of the
subsidiary, the parent can avoid direct liability for its actions.
However, despite this concern, the Court correctly decided that a parent
should be liable only for its own actions and not the actions of its subsidiary,
unless the corporate veil can be pierced, because CERCLA does not specifically
abrogate the limited liability protection of a parent. Thus, under Besfoods,
CERCLA's goals are still being accomplished, but as dictated by the specific
20 9 See id.; Part IV.B (fully listing all of the Court's articulated guidelines). In addition,
see Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Ter Maat, 13 F. Supp. 2d 756 (N.D. Ill. 1998), a recent federal
decision that applies the direct liability test of Besfoods to find a parent corporation liable under
CERCLA. The evidence in Browning-Ferris showed that there were communications (letters)
between waste transporters of the subsidiary's facility and the parent corporation concerning
activities at the facility. The subsidiary also paid the parent a management fee to conduct
administrative functions at the facility. In addition, the president of the parent corporation
(acting in his capacity as the parent president and not as director for the subsidiary)
communicated with the Illinois EPA concerning the facility, with another Illinois agency to
obtain a noise permit for the facility, and with an environmental consultant of the parent about
clean-up efforts at the facility. See id. at 64-65. Citing this evidence, the district court found that
the parent in this case was directly liable as an operator of a facility.
However, the court did not find the parent's president liable because the corporate veil was
not capable of being pierced. The court's analysis rested on the state veil-piercing standard of
Illinois as the state of incorporation. See id. at 65-66; see also Olin Corp. v. Fisons PLC, No.
93-1116-MLW, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21967, at *14-*15 (D. Mass. Sept. 22, 1998). In Olin,
the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts applied Besfoods' analysis of
direct liability to a foreign parent. The court stated that there were three times when a foreign
parent could be liable: (1) a parent can be liable when it operates a facility or is involved in
operating a facility with its subsidiary as a joint venture; (2) a parent can be liable when a dual
officer acts outside the norms of parental oversight and influence in the pollution actions of the
subsidiary;, (3) a parent can be liable when a parental agent without connections to the
subsidiary operates a facility.
2 10 See Besifoods, 524 U.S. at 70 (noting thatthis will be the presumption unless corporate
norms require a different finding or unless the action benefits the parent to the detriment of the
subsidiary wvithout a corporate justification).
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language of the statute and not judicial interpretation of congressional silence.211
C. The Major Omission ofBestfoods: What Standard of Veil Piercing
Should Apply?
One concern with the Supreme Court's approach is that the Court does not
establish whether a state or federal veil-piercing standard should be applied to
determine parent liability under CERCLA.2 12 This omission will lead to
confusion among the circuits and a less than universal approach to parent liability
under the federal statute. Some scholars argue that the standard applied should be
a federal one, since CERCLA is a federal environmental statute313 Others argue
that individual state standards should apply because different states allocate
preferences differently between business and environmental protection
interests.2 14 Following this decision's failure to designate which law should
apply, courts are able to decide which law should apply in their jurisdiction
depending on the policies behind each approach.
1. Policies Supporting a Federal Veil-Piercing Standard
The Court declined to address the issue of whether a federal or state veil-
piercing standard should be applied to determine if a parent corporation is
derivatively liable under CERCLA.2 15 Proponents of a federal standard argue that
CERCLA is a federal statute that attempts to regulate environmental hazardous
waste across the United States as a whole, and without a uniform standard as to
when a violator will be liable, the goals of CERCLA will be frustrated.2 16 These
211 See generally McKane, supra note 82, at 1674 (anticipating that this approach was
correct because it complied with the language of CERCLA and yet still accomplished
CERCLA's remedial goals).2 12 See Besifoods, 524 U.S. at 63 n.9 (expressly declining to address the issue).
2 13 See United States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 113 F.3d 572, 583-86 (6th Cir. 1997)
(Merritt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding that a federal standard is more
appropriate than state standards in this area); Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli
Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1225 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing the need for uniformity as its reason for
advocating a federal standard in this context); Jay A. McKendree, Note, Appropriate Federal
Rules of Veil-Piercing in Response to United States v. Cordova Chemical Co., 23 U. DAYTON
L. REv. 419,429 (1998) (arguing prior to the Bes~foods decision that the Supreme Court should
adopt a federal common law standard to determine veil piercing under CERCLA).
2 14 See infra Parts V.C.1-2 (discussing this issue). See generally HENRY N. BUTLER &
JONATHAN MACEY, USING FEDERALISM TO IMPROVE ENVIRONMENTAL PoLIcY 7 (1996)
(arguing that state regulation of environmental issues is appropriate and more efficient than
uniform federal regulation).
2 15 See Besgfoods, 524 U.S. at 63 n.9.
2 16 See In re Acushnet River, 675 F. Supp. 22, 30-32 (D. Mass. 1987). Acushnet found
that when considering the factors established by United States v. Kimbell, 440 U.S. 715,728-29
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proponents argue that a federal statute which seeks to protect the rights of all
citizens of the United States should not be trumped by state law which can
manipulate the standard depending on whether the state prefers business' interest
to environmental protection.2 17 Since a state standard could dictate who is liable
under a federal statute, the federal program or goal could be hindered or unfairly
restricted by the state's choice of law.2 18
(1979), determining when federal common law should be developed instead of applying state
law, that federal common law was the appropriate choice for a veil-piercing standard under
CERCLA. The court wrote: "It appears to the court to be true ... that consideration of the
appropriate factors counsels the development of a uniform [federal] rule [under CERCLA]." In
re Acushnet River, 675 F. Supp. at 31. See Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 761 F. Supp.
345, 349 (D.N.L 1991). In Mobay, the court argued that because CERCLA is a federal statute
whose purpose is to protect the environment and health of the nation, "courts are obliged to
construe provisions liberally." Id at 350. This court claimed that Congress wanted the courts to
develop a common federal law to "fill in gaps in [the] statute." Id. (citing legislative history
which stated that CERCLA will encourage the development of a uniform federal law to avoid
having known polluters congregate in states with more lenient laws). In addition, the court in
Mobay found that state common law should not "override federal legislative policies," or
"frustrate the compelling national policies underlying CERCLA." Id at 350-51; see also
Kimbell, 440 U.S. at 728-29 (stating that federal courts deciding whether to apply state or
federal law should consider whether the issue at hand requires a nationally uniform body of
law, whether the application of state law would frustrate the comprehensive and uniform federal
law in the area, and finally whether the application of federal law would negatively affect the
commercial relationships that exist within a state). See generally North Shore Gas Co. v.
Salomon, Inc., 152 F.3d 642, 650 (7th Cir. 1998) (assuming that federal common law applied to
successor liability under CERCLA, and stating that most circuits have a preference toward
federal common law to avoid frustrating the goals of CERCLA and limit forum shopping by
liable parties for stricter standards with which to protect themselves); WARREN FREEDMAN,
FEDERAL STAIUrEs ON ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECION: REGULATION IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST I
(1987) (stating that in the area of environmental protection, there is a need for "uniformity" of
legal standards to address the dangers present from environmental degradation throughout the
United States); LIGHT, supra note 21, at 110 (noting that federal judges should consider if the
issue requires a "nationally uniform body of law" to accomplish CERCLA's goals when
deciding which common law should apply). But see CHEREMIsINOFF & GRAFFIA, supra note
68, at 29 (finding that even federal policy can differ across the United States, because different
jurisdictions will apply and interpret concepts differently).
2 17 See Mobay Corp., 761 F. Supp. at 350; see also BUTLER & MACEY, supra note 214, at
17-25 (noting that the benefits to federal control of environmental issues are the detriments of
state control and that they are: (1) interstate pollution might not adequately be taken into
consideration by states when formulating environmental policies; (2) competition would occur
among the states for the attraction of new businesses with the lure of lower environmental
liability than other states, and (3) states might lack sufficient resources to administer and
enforce the effective policing of state environmental regulations). See generally id. at 6 (arguing
that federal standards in the environmental area are a product of the federal govemment's need
to claim that it is protecting the environment so that all United States citizens may receive the
benefits of a universally clean country).
2 18 See generally North Shore Gas Co., 152 F.3d at 651; Mobay Corp., 761 F. Supp. at
350. But see BUTLER & MACEY, supra note 214, at 6 (arguing that federal standards in the
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Proponents argue that a federal standard of veil piercing is the proper
standard to apply in this context, because CERCLA was enacted to be a
comprehensive and uniform statute to ensure hazardous waste clean up across the
entire United States. 219 If states could choose the veil-piercing standard to be
applied under CERCLA, the statute would not be unifomly applied and would
thus frustrate the comprehensiveness of a federal statute.220
Finally, failure to designate a federal standard could raise yet another choice
of law problem. If state law standards are applied, should courts look to the veil-
piercing standards of the state of the parent's incorporation or the state in which
the pollution took place?221 Again, the concern is that there will be nonuniform
application of a federal statute to potentially responsible parties.
2. Policies Supporting a State Veil-Piercing Standard
On the other side, federalism proponents argue that the states should be left to
regulate corporations within their borders when a federal statute does not directly
regulate an area.222 They note that since CERCLA is silent as to derivative
liability of a parent, states should be permitted to use their standard for veil
piercing to determine such liability.223 Thus, federalism advocates argue that
when an issue is not addressed by the federal government, the issue is properly
left to the states. 224 Therefore, even though CERCLA is a federal statute,
environmental area were a product of the federal government's need to claim that they were
protecting the environment so that all United States citizens could receive the benefits of a
universally clean country, and yet, federal regulations were enacted without regard to the fact
that most environmental problems were and are local in nature).
2 19 SeeMobay Corp., 761 F. Supp. at 350.
220 See id at 351-52 (arguing that state law in this context could frustrate CERCLA by
allowing responsible parties to avoid liability, and thus, diminish Superfind's resources and its
ability to react to emergency clean up situations); In re Acushnet, 675 F. Supp. at 31 (arguing
extensively that state standards should not fiustrate CERCLA's goals, and that, thus, federal
common law should be developed).
221 See AT&T Global Info. Solutions Co. v. Union Tank Car Co., 29 F. Supp. 2d 857, 865
(S.D. Ohio 1998) (suggesting that state law in the place of injury should be applied since it has
the most significant relationship to the lawsuit).
222 See Donahey v. Bogle, 129 F.3d 838, 843 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating that to pierce the
corporate veil federal courts must consider the state corporation law of theirjurisdiction); Union
Tank, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 865 (same). See generally BUILER & MACEY, supra note 214, at 7
(proposing state regulation for environmental issues to promote efficient use of natural
resources).
223 See Donahey, 129 F.3d at 843; United States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 113 F3d 572,
580 (6th Cir. 1997); Union Tank, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 865.
224 See U.S. CONST. amend. X (reserving to the states powers that are not delegated to the
federal government); see also LIGHT, supra note 21, at 110. Light argues that there is little need
to fashion a uniform federal standard for every corporate liability issue that arises in a federal
context. The norm in federal courts is instead to apply state law unless it imposes a burden on a
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corporate law is generally a state law creation 2 25 which means that it is an area
that has been left to the states to regulate. Veil-piercing standards are part of
corporate law. Therefore, state law should apply in the absence of federal
statutory law expressly directing another result.2 26
Federalism proponents also argue that the states should be permitted to apply
their individual standards for veil piercing because different states have different
preferences for environmental quality.227 Thus, some states will choose to apply a
lenient veil-piercing standard-for example, one without a fraud requirement-in
order to make it easier to find a parent liable to promote environmental interests
and the goals of CERCLA.228 However, some states will apply a standard for
parent liability that is strict-requiring a showing of fraud-to protect business
interests and to give the state a competitive edge in attracting new businesses to
incorporate within that state 229 Therefore, these proponents argue that without
express congressional override, states should also be allowed to apply their own
common law standard in this context to exemplify their individual preferences for
environmental quality. 230
Finally, they argue that a federal standard could also lead to "confusion and
uncertainty"2 31 as to which law should be applied when CERCLA intersects with
other areas of state law such as state contract law.232 There are examples of when
federal objective. In addition, there are examples of state law application in a CERCLA context
where the objectives of the statute are not deemed to be frustrated. For example, state contract
law is applied to determine if an indemnification contract is valid for the responsibility of
paying clean-up costs. This might change who is required to pay for the costs of clean up.
However, the goal of CERCLA will still be accomplished because individuals are still paying
for the costs and the government is not being forced to absorb its externalities. See id.
225 See KLEIN & CoFFEE, supra note 13, at 114 ('In general, the state saw itself as a
partner in the corporate enterprise."); LIGHT, supra note 21, at 109 (stating that corporations are
the creation of state law and courts must determine the corporate common law for their
jurisdiction).
2 26 See generally BUTLER& MACEY, supra note 214, at I (discussing the benefits of state
regulation of environmental issues).
2 27 See id. at 15; LIGHT, supra note 21, at 109 (stating that corporations are the creations
of state law and that state courts determine the corporate common law for that individual state).
2 28 See BUTLER & MACEY, supra note 214, at 15; CHEIREMISlNOFF & GRAFF, supra note
68, at 29 (stating that most environmental laws are given to states to enforce, but "enforcement
attitudes" can differ across such states).
22 9 See CHEREMISINOFF & GRAFFIA, supra note 68, at 29; see also BUMER & MACEY,
supra note 214, at 14-15 (noting that with federal environmental standards, states do not have
the opportunity to choose a less stringent standard based on the preferences and circumstances
of the particular state).
230 See Bt r & MACEY, supra note 214, at 15.
231 LIGHT, supra note 21, at 111.
232 See id. (noting the example of state contract law on indemnification contracts between
a liable party and another party who contracts to pay the clean-up costs).
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courts have applied state law to fill in other gaps in CERCLA 233 These
proponents argue that if this was not the correct approach, then the federal courts
should have developed and used federal common law to address these
instances.234
3. Which Standard Is Correct?
Circuits are left with little direction as to which law should be applied to
determine derivative liability under CERCLA. Courts can choose the standard
they apply depending on some of the policy arguments presented in sectionsV.C.1-2. 2 35
Despite the Supreme Court's failure to designate a veil-piercing standard, its
dictum suggests that state law might well be appropriate.23 6 First the Court
allowed the Sixth Circuit's application of state law to stand and secondly, the
Court seemed to support the notion that the corporate veil can be pierced only
when there is a showing of fraud or other "wrongful purposes," which was
required by the Michigan veil-piercing standard.237 In addition, the Court states
that "the entire corpus of state corporation law is [not] to be replaced simply
because a plaintiff's cause of action is based upon a federal statute."238
However, despite this dictum, a federal common law standard would be more
appropriate for this context. CERCLA is a federal statute which was designed to
be uniformly applied.2 39 If state standards of veil piercing were applied in this
context, states could adopt standards that were particularly strict-such as
requiring that the subsidiary be created to perpetuate fraud240-and thus, protect
business interests to the detriment of protecting the environment and public
2 33 See id See generally BUTLER & MACEY, supra note 214, at 4 (noting that
federalization of environmental policies was a knee jerk reaction to the environmental crisis of
the 1970s. Therefore, the choice for federal regulation was not a product of careful cost-benefit
analysis, but of "political urgency." Id.
23 4 See LIGHT, supra note 21, at 110.
2 35 See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Ter Maat, 13 F. Supp. 2d 756, 763-65 (N.D. Ill. 1998)
(choosing to apply the state law veil-piercing standard of the state of incorporation for parent
liability under CERCLA).
23 6 See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 60-63 (1998).
23 7 See id. See generally United States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 113 F.3d 572 (6th Cir.
1997).
23 8 Bes(roods, 524 U.S. at 63 (quoting Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471,478 (1979)).
23 9 See In re Acushnet River, 675 F. Supp. 22, 30-32 (D. Mass. 1987) (making a strong
argument that federal common law should be developed to fill in the gaps in CERCLA because
there is a need for uniformity of application for its goals to be successful).
240 See AT&T Global Info. Solutions Co. v. Union Tank Car Co., 29 F. Supp. 2d 857,
867-68 (S.D. Ohio 1998) (discussing why its old veil-piercing standard, which required a
showing that the subsidiary was used to perpetrate fraud, was softened to allow veil piercing
when it would be otherwise inequitable).
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health 2 41 CERCLA's goal was to protect these aspects by forcing liable parties to
clean up the contaminated sites or compelling them to pay the costs when the
government initiates the clean-up work.242 If some states permit businesses to
avoid such liability by enactment of a strict standard, then two things will result
(1) those states will have a lower level of environmental quality than citizens
elsewhere, which the federal government, and federal taxpayers (including those
from other states) will still be responsible for remediating; (2) responsible parents
in those states will be forced to internalize the costs of such contamination less
often than states which make it easier for the corporate veil to be pierced. Thus,
the Superfund, under CERCLA, will be forced to pay more to states who require
their business to internalize less. Under this scenario, CERCLA will not achieve
its goals. Therefore, to make sure the goals of CERCLA are being accomplished,
a federal common law standard should be developed with relatively lenient
requirements. This will ensure that there is nationally uniform application of the
standard and that CERCLA's goals are being adhered to and accomplished.2 43
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Besgfoods was a well-reasoned decision that attempted to be
true to both traditional notions of corporate common law, by requiring that the
corporate veil be pierced for a parent to be derivatively liable for the actions of its
subsidiary, and the goals of CERCLA, to hold those responsible for the pollution
liable for its costs. This decision changed the traditional analysis and forced the
courts to look at the operation of the facility as directed by the words of
CERCLA. Thus, if a parent is operating a facility, then it can be liable for the
241 See BUTLER & MACEY, supra note 214, at 17-25. Butler is a proponent of state law
application in the context of environmental issues, but he concedes that if state law was applied,
states might fail to consider the potential impact their pollution could have on interstate
interests. States could develop strict standards to protect their own businesses, but if their
businesses are not forced to externalize the costs of clean up, then those costs must be born by
someone and that someone is the government and the innocent taxpayers of the entire country.
This leaves them at a serious disadvantage to business interests. States might also use such
standards to compete for lucrative business interests without concern for the country's
environmental well-being or the expense that failure to have liable parties (to contribute to the
clean-up costs) will have on the environmental quality of the nation. Without liable parties,
Superfund will be without clean-up resources or will be unable to afford enforcement
proceedings. Thus, if allowing states to choose business interests over environmental quality
seems to directly inhibit the goals of CERCLA. A strict veil-piercing standard allows parents to
avoid liability. When their subsidiary's cannot absorb the liability costs, then the Superfimd
cannot react to emergency situations due to lack of fluinds and thus public health and
environmental quality for the entire country is harmed.
242 See generally supra Part IIA (examining the goals of CERCLA, including the initial
reasons for its passage and the way in which it was crafted to accomplish its goals).
243 See supra note 216.
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costs of clean up under CERCLA. The problem that the Court should have
addressed to avoid further confusion is whether a state or a federal standard for
veil piercing should apply to find a parent derivatively liable. Arguably, the more
appropriate standard should be a federal standard, since CERCLA is a federal
statute that was intended to be uniformly applied and state law standards might
hinder this goal.
